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INTRODUCTION
The credit derivatives instrument market is like a new continent
with boundless opportunity. 1 Financial institutions, as well as individual
investors, are mobilizing all of their resources as they jump into this
frontier head-on. 2 Opportunity overflows in the financial market, but
the competition is becoming increasingly fierce. 3 Cutting edge financial
products are introduced every day. 4 Credit derivatives lead the way.
The credit derivatives market is somewhat akin to the middle age
practice of alchemy, by which practitioners attempted to convert lead
into gold. 5 The goal of each is to create new value. Although the
alchemists failed, “financial engineering” 6 of the present era succeeds in
creating new value through the highest levels of statistical analysis, 7 in
many ways actually creating something from nothing. Derivative

1. See ANTULIO N. BOMFIM, UNDERSTANDING CREDIT DERIVATIVES AND RELATED
INSTRUMENTS 291 (2005) (referring to the credit derivatives market as “still a relatively
young marketplace”).
2. See Mark Parsley, Credit Derivatives Get Cracking, EUROMONEY, Mar. 1996,
at 28.
There are hundreds of possible [credit derivatives] applications: 1. for commercial
banks that want to change the risk profile of their loan books, 2. for investment bank
managing huge bond and derivatives portfolios, 3. for manufacturing companies overexposed to a single customer, 4. for equity investors in project finance deals with
unacceptable sovereign risk, 5. for institutional investors that have unusual risk
appetites [or just want to speculate], and 6. for employees worried about the safety of
their deferred remuneration.

Id.
3.
4.

See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
See ROBERT E. WHALEY, DERIVATIVES: MARKETS, VALUATION, AND RISK
MANAGEMENT 11-18 (2006) (describing the evolution of derivatives markets and tools).
5. But see STANDARD & POOR’S, GLOBAL CASH FLOW AND SYNTHETIC CDO
CRITERIA 14 (2002), http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/cdo_crite
ria2002_FINALTOC.pdf (“This is not alchemy or turning straw into gold, but rather the
implementation of structured finance to create different investment risk profiles, based
on the structuring of credit support.”).
6. See ROBERT M. MCLAUGHLIN, OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES PRODUCTS:
A GUIDE TO BUSINESS AND LEGAL RISK MANAGEMENT AND DOCUMENTATION 1 (1998)
(introducing uses of the term “financial engineering”).
7. See id. at 14. But see Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and
Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1042 (2007) (“Although the
mathematic techniques of [derivatives] technology are sophisticated, they are subject to
the limitations of ‘garbage in, garbage out.’”).

2008

VANILLA SWAPS TO EXOTIC CREDIT DERIVATIVES

707

dealers and financial engineers are indeed the alchemists of the modern
era.
Is a credit derivatives instrument transaction a financial transaction?
Or is it gambling? The use of credit derivatives instruments greatly
increased once the deregulation of the 1980s spurred greater movement
of capital internationally. 8 As they became a recognized means of
hedging risk, derivative transactions based on the buying and selling of
future risks increased in frequency and value. 9 Initially, derivative
transactions developed to manage the various types of financial risk 10
that companies typically face. 11 Credit derivatives instruments satisfied
the needs of investors who wanted to reduce asset risk in volatile
markets. 12 In addition, investors used diverse investment tools through
derivative transactions, such as “legging arbitrage,” 13 which takes
8. See WHALEY, supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining how credit
derivatives instrument transactions were developed because U.S. financial institutions
made loans to the emerging markets, and have held lots of bonds issued by them since
the early 1990s).
9. Generally, the motive of investor participation in derivatives transactions is to
reduce or remove risk, if possible, by hedging their portfolios value. See Bank One
Corp. v. Comm’r, 120 T.C. 174, 206-07 (2003).
In the early days of the swaps market, dealers employed simple hedging strategies.
Transactions designed to meet a customer’s requirements were immediately hedged
by entering into an offsetting transaction, such as a matched swap. In the later years,
many dealers . . . adopted more sophisticated portfolio strategies for hedging market
risks. Under this approach, all of the dealer’s transactions were broken down into
their component cashflows to yield a measure of the net (residual) market exposures
arising from all of the dealer’s positions. The residual market exposures were then
hedged in various ways such as by taking positions in the cash market (e.g., holding or
selling short U.S. Treasury securities), by using interest-rate futures (which are traded
on public exchanges), or by entering into swaps.

Id.
10. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 11. One practicing attorney uses the term
financial risk in a unique manner. His literature “uses the term financial risk in the
economic or statistical sense of uncertainty of outcome, meaning simply that more than
one outcome of varying degrees of desirability is possible for any given decision.” Id.
11. See DAVID A. DUBOFSKY & THOMAS W. MILLER, JR., DERIVATIVES:
VALUATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT 23 (2003).
12. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 15-16 (“[R]isk management [applying
derivatives] reduces a firm or portfolio’s risks by enabling it to (1) transfer, sell, or
hedge the source of the unwanted risk, (2) diversify the unwanted risk, or (3) insure
against any losses that might arise from the unwanted risk.”).
13. See Brandon Becker et al., Restrictions and Obligations of Broker-Dealers
Engaged in Proprietary Trading, SL047 ALI-ABA 115, 148 (2006) (noting that legging
arbitrage is a derivatives transaction skill, “[w]here a market professional introduces an
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advantage of the difference between spot price and the price of futures,
and synthetic transactions between swaps and futures. 14
An interesting paradox arose, however, as credit derivatives
instruments, developed initially for risk management, continued to grow
and become more sophisticated with the help of financial engineering—
the tail began wagging the dog. 15 In becoming a medium for speculative
transactions, credit derivatives increased, rather than alleviated, risk.
This Article explores interpretation of the term “credit event,” 16 an
important element of “settlement” 17 in the credit derivatives instrument
transaction. In fact, the definition of a credit event is at the very core of
all swap transactions, including the Credit Default Swap (“CDS”). 18
Part I introduces similar derivatives that were historically used by
financial institutions and mentions the development process of the
derivative financial market. Part II provides a brief explanation of the
various financial products that are used in the credit derivatives
instrument market. Part III addresses the legal mechanism of a credit
derivatives swap, the most frequent type of transaction in the market
today. Part IV discusses general issues related to the credit event. Part
V reviews pertinent cases that have been litigated in federal court. In
particular, as the interpretation of “credit event” faces fierce dispute, the
International Swap and Derivatives Association’s (“ISDA”) definition of

intentional delay (up to one day, or even two days) between the transactions in an effort
to profit from short-term price movement”).
14. See Peter Tufano, Financial Innovation, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS
OF FINANCE 307, 320 (G.M. Constantinides, M. Harris & R. M. Stulz eds. 2003),
available at http://www.dklevine.com/archive/fininnov_tufano_june2002.pdf (noting
that the unique characteristics of modern financial engineering are innovative
structuring of financial instruments and designing vehicles under investor’s specific
financial goals).
15. See generally Jongho Kim, Can Risks be Reduced in the Derivatives Market?
Lessons from the Deal Structure Analysis of Modern Financial Engineering Debacles, 6
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 29 (forthcoming 2008) (detailing a variety of collapsed
derivative transaction cases).
16. CREDIT DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS § 4.1 (Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n
1999) [hereinafter 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS] (“‘Credit Event’ means, with respect to a
Credit Derivatives Transaction, one or more of Bankruptcy, Failure to Pay, Obligation
Acceleration, Obligation Default, Repudiation/Moratorium or Restructuring, as
specified in the related Confirmation.”).
17. See id. § 3.11; see also infra Part IV.F.
18. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 289-90.
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sovereign debt restructuring has become increasingly important. 19 The
discussion focuses on which interpretation is proper under given
circumstances. The conclusion includes an assessment of the courts’
interpretation of “credit event” and some recommendations.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DERIVATIVES MARKETS
Credit derivatives instrument transactions originated in 1993 with
the buying and selling of notes of specific transactions by Bankers Trust
and Credit Suisse Financial Products of Japan, who linked these notes
with the specific risk of default. 20 Although it is true that the phrase
“credit derivatives instrument transaction” is now common in the
financial industry, the notion of linking “credit risk” 21 existed in the past
with concepts such as “loan participation,” 22 “risk participation,” 23 and
“repo transaction.” 24 These transactions can be referred to as traditional
credit risk linked transactions, since they all transfer counterparty credit
risk to a third party.
Of course, it might be rather far-fetched to claim that these
transactions are basically of the same format, since there are some
differences in terms of the background, framework and structure of each.
In addition, the basic transactional flows—recently referred to as both
credit derivatives instrument transactions and transactions of traditional
financial products—differ. In particular, risk participation transactions
share many similarities with the CDS transactions that are often

19. See Joseph P. Collins & Pamela J. Sackmann, Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw,
LLP, A Structured Finance Trio: Assessing the Legal and Regulatory Environment for
Credit Derivatives, SECTION NEWSLETTER (Am. Bar Ass’n/ Section of Bus. Law,
Commercial Fin. Servs. Forum, San Francisco, Cal.), Aug. 11, 2003, at 20,
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/newsletter/0017/materials/trio.pdf.
20. See Parsley, supra note 2, at 28.
21. See generally DUBOFSKY & MILLER, supra note 11, at 318-20; see also Norman
Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-The-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 677, 689 (2002) (“Credit risk is exposure to the possibility that a counterparty will
default on its obligations when due because of insolvency.”).
22. See generally ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE
SECURITIES LAWS § 9:110 (2005) (describing the loan participation mechanism).
23. See generally Risk-based Capital Credit-risk Weight Categories, 12 C.F.R. §
567.6 (b)(6)(i)-(ii) (2003) (providing an example of risk participation regulations).
24. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 624 (discussing repurchase agreements).
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regarded as typical credit derivatives today. 25 Even when the transaction
is one that deals with a credit derivative of a new format, there are
indeed many instances in which the intentions of those engaging in the
transactions are, in fact, very similar to the traditional credit risk linked
transaction. 26
Focus should not be placed merely on credit derivatives of the socalled “new” format when considered from the perspective of managing
banks’ credit risk. Instead, it is essential to examine which elements of
the same transaction are linked to credit risk and how the funding
participation, risk participation, and repo transactions are conducted and
in which format. This Article next examines funding participation and
risk participation transactions.
A. Yesterday
Funding participation 27 is conducted mostly by linking a traditional
loan transaction with a funding participation agreement. 28 For example,
when Bank A deals with Company B for a typical loan, Bank A signs a
separate funding participation agreement with Bank C. The key to the
funding participation transaction is that Bank C, referred to as the
participant, supplies part or all of the capital for the loan that Bank A
provides to Company B. Bank A, in turn, loans the capital in its name to
Company B by adding the capital provided by Bank C to its own. The
most important aspect of the funding participation transaction is that if
Company B does not pay back the loan, then Bank A has no obligation to
return the capital provided by Bank C. Otherwise, Bank A assumes the
obligation to return the capital to Bank C when the loan is paid back by
Company B. 29 There are instances, however, when Bank A agrees on the
25. See
Huntington
Bank,
Risk
Participation
Agreement,
https://www.huntington.com/bas/Risk_Participation_Agreement.htm (last visited Feb.
28, 2008) (illustrating a risk participation agreement and customer hedges floating-rate
loan as an essential business tool).
26. COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS., CREDIT RISK TRANSFER, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS 4 (2003) [hereinafter CGFS].
27. See JACOBS, supra note 22.
28. See CGFS, supra note 26, at 37.
29. See E. Carolan Berkley, Multiple Lender/Multiple Borrower Transactions, in
ASSET BASED FINANCING 2007, at 333, 335 (2007). In the funding participation
transaction, Company B and Bank C negotiate the terms of the loan directly depending
on the relationship between the parties. However, there are instances in which a loan is
obtained by having Bank A act as the fronting bank with the specific goal of cutting
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funding participation transaction with Bank C after providing the loan to
Company B, but prior to the loan’s maturity. At this time, Company B
might not know that Bank A signed an agreement for funding
participation separately with Bank C. 30 If such is the case, the funding
participation transaction may be considered one that transfers credit risk
to a third party.
Therefore, this type of transaction has the
characteristics of a credit derivative. 31
Risk participation transactions have been used in financial markets
for a long time. 32 While “risk” in the risk participation transaction refers
to the parties’ credit risk, facets of the underlying transaction may be the
actual source of the risk. 33 For example, if Bank A lends capital to
Company B, Bank A may sign an agreement for a risk participation
transaction with Bank C in order to transfer the credit risk of Company
B. The main details are summarized in the following two ways. First,
Bank A pays a participation fee to Bank C in exchange for Bank C’s
assumption of Company B’s credit risk, either in part or in its entirety,
during the lending period.
The transaction process is as follows: (1) Bank A provides a loan to
Company B; (2) Bank A then transfers the credit risk to Bank C. Bank C
also pays a participation fee as financial compensation if Company B
fails to pay back the loan, a burden which would otherwise be borne by
Bank A. Absent such a failure, Company B still bears a loan obligation
to Bank A. If Company B cannot pay back its debt for whatever reason,
Bank C pays Bank A as agreed. This could consist of either a part of or
the total amount that Company B defaulted. The gain for Bank A is the
transfer of the risk that Company B will default to Bank C.
Second, the risk participation transaction may also be used if Bank
A issues a “performance bond” to yet another company, Company D, at
Company B’s request. In short, Bank A signs the agreement for a risk

taxes or bypassing the loan limit by not having Company B get the loan directly from
Bank C. In this case, funding participation transaction essentially becomes different
than the credit risk linked transaction and more similar to a syndicate loan.
30. See id. at 337.
31. See DUBOFSKY & MILLER, supra note 11, at 17 (“Derivatives allow the user to
transfer . . . risks to other parties who are willing and able to accept them”).
32. See Blaise Gadanecz, The Syndicated Loan Market: Structure, Development
and Implications, 2004 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS Q. REV. 75, 75, available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0412g.pdf.
33. See SATYAJIT DAS, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: TRADING & MANAGEMENT OF CREDIT
& DEFAULT RISK 146 (1998).
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participation transaction with Bank C after issuing a performance bond
to Company D, thus transferring all or part of Company B’s credit risk. 34
If Company B does not fulfill its obligation to Company D, Bank A must
pay compensatory damages to Company D. These damages substitute
for performance protection. Meanwhile, if Company B does not fulfill
its commitment despite the claim to compensate Bank A’s loss, Bank C
must compensate all or part of Bank A’s loss, according to the risk
participation agreement.
Of course, Bank A pays part of the
participation fee received by Bank C from Company B during the
duration of the risk participation agreement. In the end, Bank A has
transferred the credit risk of its investment in Company B to Bank C
through the risk participation transaction, in a similar manner to deals
involving credit derivatives. 35
B. Today
Since the 1980s, the international financial markets have
experienced global integration, 36 with liberalization, 37 deregulation, 38

34. (1) Assumption of obligation by Company B to Company D, (2) Company B
promises to supply Bank A’s guarantee to the Company D, (3) Company B asks Bank A
to issue a guarantee for Company D, (4) Bank A’s promise to perform for Company B,
(5) Bank A issues guarantee for Company D, (6) Bank A’s right to indemnity for
Company B, (7) Bank A transfers credit risk on Company B to Bank C in addition to the
participation fee payment, (8) Bank A performs guarantee to Company D if Company B
fails to pay obligation for Company D, (9) Bank A asks Bank C for compensation for the
loss incurred by the performance of guarantee for Company D, (10) Bank C assumes the
risk in case of default.
35. See Berkley, supra note 29, at 336-37 (explaining various reasons for multiple
lender agreements).
36. See Rosa Giovanna Barresi, The Impact of Monetary Union and the EURO on
European Capital Markets: What May be Achieved in Capital Market Integration, 28
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1257, 1303 (2005) (noting how this trend influences markets of
individual nations around the world as well, which in turn means that the liberalization
of the financial markets within regions is also gaining momentum every day). With the
adoption of “Bancassurance,” the different sectors of the financial industry became
fully integrated. Id.; see also CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS, U.S. BANK DEREGULATION IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 334 (2000) (identifying the integration between regions and
markets as one of the key characteristics of the current financial market); Lawrence
L.C. Lee, Integration of International Banking Supervisory Standards: A Blueprint for
the Taiwanese Banking System, 19 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 455, 536 (2000) (“The
globalization of the international banking sector stimulates the functioning of national
financial systems and accelerates and broadens the process of financial liberalization
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and securitization 39 occurring simultaneously. Meanwhile, efficiency 40
benefits have improved capital liquidity. 41 Moreover, new financial
and deregulation. Through liberalization and deregulation, the international banking
industry becomes a more competitive and efficient market.”) (citation omitted).
37. See generally GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE
HAZARDS OF BANK BAILOUTS 77 (2004) (discussing the expansion of banking power);
see also Larry A. Frieder, Legislating for Interstate Bank Expansion: Financial
Deregulation and Public Policy, 9 J. CORP. L. 673, 728 (1984) (discussing how
financial business liberalization increases competition among financial institutions in
the non-banking sector such as insurance and trust and securities that are now
competing with banks). Increased profit results from increased effectiveness and
expansion of the banks’ traditional service offerings. For example, securities
companies in the U.S. that handle Money Market Mutual Funds (“MMMF”) can
establish Point-of-Sale (“POS”) or Customer-Bank Communications Terminals
(“CBCT”) for the end users. Id. However, securities companies can also use customer
networks along with the traditional securities related work. Thus, actual cost for the
amortization assumed by the securities companies for the installation of EFT may not
be that high.
38. It is important to note, however that “[d]eregulation has both benefits and
costs.” John J. Merrick Jr. & Anthony Saunders, Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy,
17 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 691, 692 (1985). “An essential point sometimes
overlooked by critics of bank deregulation is that activity deregulation may provide as
much opportunity for banks to explore new approaches to managing current risks as it
does to assume new ones.” Id. at 695 (emphasis omitted). See, e.g., Extensions of Credit
by Federal Reserve Banks, 12 C.F.R. §205.3 (2007) (permitting the link to Fed Wire
that can provide Electronic Fund Transfer (“EFT”) payment service without using a
bank account by using POS or CBCT). It was against this backdrop that investors
demanded regulation of the interest on deposits. Accordingly, banks have sought to
bypass interest rate regulations through financial innovation, or through the very
deregulation that sought to alleviate banking restrictions, both of which may account for
the introduction of credit risk. Moreover, rapid advances in electronic banking could
result in systematic risk as parties become tied to highly sophisticated information and
communication systems. Increases in these types of risks may mean higher costs for
financial institutions and the entire financial system. Professors Merrick and Saunders
indicate that “some off-balance-sheet items –in particular, forward, futures, and options
contracts–can serve to explicitly decrease banking sector risk if used properly.” Id.
(emphasis omitted). It is not clear whether all the risks that are faced by the financial
institutions in the wake of deregulation will lead to decreased profitability of the
financial institutions. Increased price competition tends to remove inefficiency within
the banking system. Thus, deregulation can contribute to cutting cost and increasing
profit. Diane P. Wood et al., Acquisitions and Mergers, in 30TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST
LAW INSTITUTE, at 225, 311 n.12 (1989).
39. See Anshu S. K. Pasricha, On Financial Sector Reform in Emerging Markets:
Enhancing Creditors’ Rights and Securitizing Non-Performing Loans in the Indian
Banking Sector—An Elephant’s Tale, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 357-58 (2007); see also
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products and financial engineering techniques are constantly developed
in line with advances in information technology. 42 Likewise, diverse
financial services are provided to satisfy customer needs. 43 Credit risk is
increasing, however, which some consider a necessary evil. 44
The financial institutions that assume this type of credit risk may
collect the applicable loan obligation earlier simply by selling the
Joseph A. Smith, Jr., Financial Literacy, Regulation and Consumer Welfare, 8 N.C.
BANKING INST. 77, 79 (2004) (noting that products such as Asset Backed Securities or
Credit Linked Notes can be considered part of the securitization trends of the financial
industry).
40. See DON M. CHANCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES 11 (4th ed. 1998).
[E]fficiency is the characteristic of a market in which the prices of the instruments
trading therein reflect their true economic values to the investors. In an efficient
market, prices fluctuate randomly and investors cannot consistently earn returns above
those that would compensate them for the level of risk they assume.

Id.
41. See David M. Jones, Fed Policy, Financial Market Efficiency, and Capital
Flows, 54 J. FIN. 1501, 1505 (1999) (noting the existence of massive global capital
flows).
42. See Niels Hermes & Robert Lensink, Does Financial Liberalization Influence
Saving, Investment and Economic Growth? Evidence from 25 Emerging Market
Economies, 1973-96 4 (UNU/WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2005/69, 2005); see also
MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 6. Drastic decreases in the cost of amortization resulting
from technological innovation increases the cost needed to enforce regulations when it
comes to the work domain. This can, in turn, speed the process toward alleviation or
elimination of regulations. See id. at 5. When the cost for the amortization decreases to
a point that it can be forgotten altogether, the banking industry could then be considered
an industry that enables competition and plays a definite role in the continued
participation of the market participants concerning organizational level efficiency.
Formation of a market where competition in the banking industry is enabled can
increase banks’ ability to increase profit. Moreover, this would be a confirmation of the
decreases in marginal cost which can result from diversifying the banking industry. Id.
43. See Hermes & Lensink, supra note 42, at 3. Deregulation brought about drastic
expansion and deepening of the open markets such as the stock exchange. As a result,
traditional capital sourcing through banks decreased while the share of capital raised
through the open market increased. See id. at 3-6 (noting that the portion of the banks’
profit that was earned through traditional banking decreased significantly, while the
portion from investments and participation fees increased). Accordingly, banks began
to sell deposits that pay market interest so that the deposits would not leak out of the
banking system. They also began to raise the capital that they needed from the shortterm market. As the level of reliance on the capital that is closely linked to market
interest rates increases, banks have more exposure to the risk that follows a change in
interest rates. Id.; see also id. at 8 (noting how financial liberalization has also increased
the liquidity risk of banks).
44. See id. at 4.
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obligation at a discount. 45 While this may indeed eliminate credit risk
easily, it may also mean relinquishing the opportunity to earn profit.
Given that the assumption of credit risk is the foundation for a bank’s
profit creation, the taking on of credit risk is, to a certain degree,
essential. Credit risk is not a new concept by any means. Considering
that management of credit risk has long been a part of the banking
industry, why is it that its importance is so strongly emphasized today?
First, the potential for default or possibility of bankruptcy is
increasing due to greater competition among companies. 46 Advances in
information technology, along with foreign countries’ increased market
liberalization, 47 result in global competition. Accordingly, domestic
competition is fiercer, as seen in the rise in bankruptcy rates. 48
Second, capital market advancement creates a winner’s curse. 49 As
capital markets develop, young and small venture companies with high
risk can now raise capital more easily. 50 Consequently, managing and
transferring these companies’ risk has become an important issue for
financial institutions. 51

45.
46.

See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 37.
See Will Skowronski, Business Bankruptcy Rate Will Rise, Report Predicts,
WASH. BUS. J., Aug. 23, 2007, available at http://washington.bizjournals.com/washingt
on/stories/2007/08/20/daily27.html (“The U.S. Bankruptcy Courts reported that 6,705
businesses declared bankruptcy in the quarter ended June 30, [2007], up from 4,858
during the same period last year [2006].”).
47. See Lee, supra note 36, at 455 n.3 (defining liberalization of the banking
sector).
48. See Skowronski, supra note 46; see also Business Bankruptcy Rates Continue
to Rise in 2007, PR NEWSWIRE, (Aug. 21. 2007), http://www.prnewswire.com/cgibin/stories.pl?ACCT=109&STORY=/www/story/08-21-2007/0004649151&EDATE=.
49. See PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURINGS 149 (3d ed. 2002) (“[T]he ironic hypothesis . . . states that bidders
who over-estimate the value of a target will most likely win a contest.”).
50. See generally Jeffrey E. Sohl, The US Angel and Venture Capital Market:
Recent Trends and Developments, 6 J. PRIVATE EQUITY 7 (2003) (describing the
evolution of venture capital markets).
51. Id.
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Third, there is more competition among financial institutions. 52 As
a result of the abolition of the Glass-Steagall Act, 53 financial institutions
today compete on a geographic scale beyond their home region. 54
Because profit margin decreases with time in the traditional business
domain, a business will inevitably target investments with the highest
return. Since this type of investment always comes with a high level of
risk, 55 effective management of risk is critical. Against this backdrop,
credit derivatives instruments have continued to grow since the 1990s in
order to block excessive exposure to and hedge against credit risk. 56
Fourth, the value of collateral, including real estate, is uncertain, 57
as the 1997 financial crisis in Asia demonstrated. 58 This is a significant
limitation on lenders’ ability to manage credit risk.

52. See Switzerland as a Financial Centre: Top-Quality Performance and
Impressive Dimensions, No. 21 FDF NEWSLETTER (Fed. Dep’t of Fin., Bern, Switz.),
June 2002, at 2, available at http://www.efd.admin.ch/dokumentation/00737/00759/007
68/index.html?lang=en (reporting that financial markets are undergoing rapid change as
a result of the worldwide deregulation of capital transfers, technological progress and
financial innovation). As a consequence, the pressure of international competition in
the intensive value-add financial sector has increased considerably. Against this
backdrop, it is possible that further global centers for various types of financial services
will establish themselves. Id.
53. See Reem Heakal, What was the Glass-Steagall Act?, INVESTOPEDIA, July 16,
2003, available at http://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/071603.asp (“[I]n
November of 1999 Congress repealed the [Glass-Steagal Act (“GSA”)] with the
establishment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which eliminated the GSA restrictions
against affiliations between commercial and investment banks. Furthermore, the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act allows banking institutions to provide a broader range of
services, including underwriting and other dealing activities.”); see also JOHN SPIEGEL,
ALAN GART & STEVEN GART, BANKING REDEFINED: HOW SUPERREGIONAL
POWERHOUSES ARE RESHAPING FINANCIAL SERVICES 57 (1996) (“[R]epeal of the act
should reduce the risks of most banks by providing the opportunity for further
diversification.”) (citation omitted).
54. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
55. See Parsley, supra note 2, at 31-32.
56. See MOORAD CHOUDHRY, STRUCTURED CREDIT PRODUCTS: CREDIT
DERIVATIVES AND SYNTHETIC SECURITIZATION 5-10 (2004) (illustrating the background
of the emerging Credit Derivative instruments); see also MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6
and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Appeals of Material Supervisory Determinations: Guidelines &
Decisions, SARC-97-01 at *1-2 (FDIC Sept. 15, 1997), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations
/laws/sarc/sarcappeals/sarc9701.html; see also Technical Memorandum from H. Carl
McCall, Off. of the State Deputy Comptroller for the City of New York, The East Asian
Economic Crisis: A Background Report on the Implications for New York City 14
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Fifth, “floor deal type OTC products” and off-balance sheet
transactions have grown significantly in popularity. 59 As financial
institutions began to handle large volumes of OTC deals, which
increased their off-balance sheet transactions, the counterparty risk of
each increased dramatically. 60 In addition, counterparty risk can
substantially increase with unfavorable fluctuations in exchange rates,
interest rates, or index futures. 61 Furthermore, there is a greater chance
that the large scale speculative transaction may become useful since the
limitation on it is less than that on spot transactions, and it is
comparatively easy to execute. 62 This has the potential to cause large
scale financial crises.
Most of the credit derivatives instrument transactions require
merely a small monetary deposit, known as a margin, which equals the
specific percentage of the transacted product’s face value. 63 Therefore,
it offers a greater “leverage effect” 64 over the gain/loss fluctuation rate
of transactions compared to that of the market price. Accordingly,

(Apr. 27, 1998), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/reports/nyc/economic/tm199/tm199.htm
(“[C]apital outflows drove down the prices of real estate and domestic equities, which
banks held as collateral.”). “One of the biggest challenges for Japan is to restructure its
financial system following stagnation throughout the 1990s brought on by the bursting
of a tremendously speculative real estate bubble.” Id. at 27.
58. See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Council on
Foreign Relations Financial Crisis Conference *2 (July 12, 2000), http://www.federal
reserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2000/20000712.htm.
59. See CHRIS FRANCIS, ATISH KAKODKAR & BARNABY MARTIN, MERRILL LYNCH,
CREDIT DERIVATIVE HANDBOOK 2003: A GUIDE TO PRODUCTS, VALUATION,
STRATEGIES AND RISKS 4-6 (2003) (describing market size and market structure); see
also WHALEY, supra note 4, at 18-19.
60. See generally WHALEY, supra note 4, at 15-19 (describing the nature and
amount of risk assumed by the parties involved in a number of OTC transactions).
61. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 109 (“This risk reflects the potential
failure by the counterparty to make a payment when it is due.”).
62. See ALFRED STEINHERR, DERIVATIVES: THE WILD BEAST OF FINANCE 189-90
(2000).
63. See, e.g., Michael D. Dayan & Glen A. Rae, OTC Equity Derivatives: Hedging
Transactions and Equity Swaps Outline, in SWAPS & OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 2006, at
560-61 (2006) (“SEC determined that total return swap was a disguised financing that
violated the margin regulations.”).
64. See CHANCE, supra note 40, at 18 (defining leverage effect as “small price
changes can lead to large gains and losses”).
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policies regulating financial viability now emphasize credit risk even
more than in the past. 65
C. Tomorrow
The growth rate of credit derivatives going forward might be
forecasted by answering the following question: what exactly is the
basic usefulness of credit derivatives instruments? Motives and
objectives for engaging in credit derivatives transactions vary in
connection with the working-level financial transaction. 66 These
objectives do not always manifest in the same way. 67 Moreover, they
vary with the individual products related to the specific transaction. The
reality is that there are credit derivatives transactions motivated solely
by the transfer of credit risk. 68 Likewise, even though buyers and sellers
gain different utilities from transferring credit risk, each specific
transaction remains valuable to each participant.
The transaction of credit derivatives can become a means for
hedging credit risk. 69 A CDS 70 or Total Return Swap (“TRS”) 71 enables
banks to transfer a customer’s credit risk. For this reason, “banks will
gradually become more willing to actively trade credit risks.” 72 If the
possibility of a borrower’s default increases due to a change in
circumstances, it is possible for the bank to separate itself from the
65. See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2(d), (g) (2006). Even though
OTC derivatives markets are beyond the scope of the SEC’s CFTC jurisdiction, there
are certain transactions that may fall within the agency’s jurisdiction. Federal banking
regulators oversee bank activities except specific OTC derivatives transactions.
66. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 9 (introducing bank’s transaction
objectives which mitigate risk in loan portfolios and generate greater returns).
67. See Willa E. Gibson, Investors, Look Before You Leap: The Suitability Doctrine
Is Not Suitable For OTC Derivatives Dealers, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 527, 540-42 (1998)
(identifying three derivative market participants, all of whom have different transaction
motives). Hedgers attempt to offset risks that they hold in underlying portfolios;
speculators take unhedged risk in the pursuit of profits; and arbitrageurs, who seek
return without risk, take the opposite position in mispriced derivatives vehicles. Id.
68. See generally LILLIAN CHEW, MANAGING DERIVATIVE RISKS: THE USE AND
ABUSE OF LEVERAGE 126-27 (1996) (detailing the credit risk implications of derivative
instrument transactions).
69. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 41.
70. See infra Part II.B.
71. See infra Part II.C.
72. See JANET M. TAVAKOLI, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: A GUIDE TO INSTRUMENTS AND
APPLICATIONS 242 (1998).
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credit risk by transferring the default risk of a loan obligation to another
party. 73 This type of transfer (assignment) should be communicated to
the borrower, and he or she should pay back the loan to the assignee (the
transferee or risk buyer) after the transfer. 74 Thus, some aspects of this
transaction make it difficult for the bank to choose this route.
Nevertheless, in certain cases, a CDS or TRS can be an appropriate
alternative for hedging credit risk.
Conventional wisdom holds that a borrower’s financial situation
will deteriorate significantly after the loan is granted. 75 If the
borrower’s financial situation is expected to improve, however, the bank
can target a specific time period in which to hedge against the credit
risk. The bank can also choose to either not use the CDS until the
principal obligation has matured, or to buy a credit option in order to
hedge risk for a specific period of time.
Credit derivatives transactions can be a useful tool for solving the
“credit paradox.” 76 When the credit risk on a specific borrower is too
high, a host of regulations could be implicated. 77 Limitations on the
loans to the same party are the most typical restrictions under statutory

73.
74.

See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 680.
See SHERREE DECOVNY, SWAPS 29 (2d ed. 1998) (“Usually at the outset of a
swap transaction, the two counterparties agree that each has the right to assign the
contract subject to other’s approval, and this should be written into the
documentation.”).
75. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 41.
76. See Krishna Guha, World Economy Confronted by Liquidity Paradox, FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2007, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1c481a66-51a5-11dc8779-0000779fd2ac.html (reporting on the liquidity paradox in the world economy); see
also Martin Wolf, The Paradox of Thrift: Excess Savings are Storing up Trouble for the
TIMES,
June
13,
2007,
available
at
World
Economy,
FIN.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/00b05180-dba8-11d9-913a-00000e2511c8.html (noting that
the term “paradox” is used in various situations). Sometimes “what is good for
individuals can be bad for an economy.” Id.; see also Prime Movers - Beware the
Fragile Relationship Between Prime Brokers and Hedge Funds, THE ECONOMIST, Aug.
9, 2007, available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/9641175/c_2984411/?f=archives
(reporting a paradox at the heart of the financial markets); infra note 78 and
accompanying text. But see CARBON360, INC., IMPACT OF INCLUSION OF CAPITAL
STRUCTURE ARBITRAGE & OTHER CREDIT STRATEGIES ON HEDGE FUND OPERATIONS 26
(2005) (arguing the negative impression of transacting of CDSs due to the so called
“Credit Paradox”).
77. See Smith, supra note 39, at 89-90 (citing North Carolina’s predatory lending
statute which prohibits various loans).
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banking regulations, 78 but banks will also often have these types of
restrictions as part of their internal policy. 79 If a bank’s lending line for
a certain client exceeds either the statutory limit or the internal standard,
the bank will find it difficult to issue a new loan. The clash between the
interests of the bank’s loan officer, who is interested in creating new
loans, and the credit risk manager, who seeks to manage the credit risk
portfolio, is known as the “credit paradox” 80
The bank may inform the client that new loans cannot be granted
because the credit limit has been reached. Denying a new loan creates
the risk of jeopardizing the relationship with an existing client, which
can result in a client’s defection. A lender also faces difficulty denying
the loan when the borrower exceeds only the bank’s internal standard.
In this situation, a bank would likely provide a long-standing customer
with a loan and transfer the credit risk by way of a credit derivative. 81
Even when there is almost no profit gained, the bank might hope to
strengthen its ties with the client through this type of transaction, while
not exceeding its credit limits. This process is similar to the
aforementioned “credit risk hedging method” in that they both transfer
the credit risk; however, the motives differ. 82 In using a credit risk

78. See Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220 (2002); see also Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. §
221 (2002).
79. See DAS, supra note 33, at 135, 147.
80. Supra note 76 and accompanying text. The traditional method with which the
banks manage credit risk is diversification of the parties loaned. While diversifying
parties loaned for credit risk management, it is difficult to effectively execute the
monitoring of the companies, which is a reason for the existence of banks. Monitoring
of the companies is still conducted, yet in-depth and specialized monitoring is possible
only when monitoring very few companies. This creates a contradictory relationship
between efficient monitoring and efficient risk sharing, which is another example of a
credit paradox.
81. See, e.g., Robert D. Aicher, Deborah L. Cotton & T.K. Khan, Credit
Enhancement: Letters of Credit, Guaranties, Insurance and Swaps (The Clash of
Cultures), 59 BUS. LAW 897, 956 (2004).
A credit default swap can be used as a form of credit enhancement in a variety of
contexts in substitution for other types of credit enhancement. For example, a lender
to a borrower, instead of taking the guaranty of a guarantor, could enter into a credit
default swap with such guarantor in respect of the borrower’s obligations to the
lender.

Id.
82. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 117.
The goal of the hedge is to freeze the value of the asset or liability. . . . The purpose
of a hedge is to make the cashflows of the derivative and the hedged instrument
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hedging method, credit risk is transferred for the purpose of hedging,
and is based on the determination that credit risk exists. 83 With a
derivative instrument, the bank is simply complying with a statute or
internal policy regardless of potential credit risk.
A credit derivatives transaction is also a “market risk” 84 hedging
method. 85 In general, credit derivatives instrument transactions are
perceived as being conducted in relation to credit risk, not market risk. 86
There is no question that the overall characteristics of a credit
derivatives instrument are based on credit risk. Market risks, however,
arising from the interest rate, 87 FOREX exchange rate, and stock price 88
can exist depending on the structure and terms of the transaction of the
credit derivatives instrument. 89
For example, assume that the stock price of Company B is $10 on
the day of the TRS agreement signing, and Bank A has one million
shares of the stock. If Bank A predicts that the stock price of Company
B will change frequently within a year, Bank A can dispose of applicable
stocks and recuperate the invested amount to eliminate the stock price
risk. Bank A, however, can hedge the stock price volatility through a
TRS transaction if there is a possibility that the stock price may fall due
to the sudden sale of a large volume of shares, or if the sale of Company
B’s stock is not desired from a long-term perspective. In other words,

symmetrical, so that losses and gains will cancel each other out both as an accounting
matter and in terms of the timing of actual cashflows.

Id.
83. See CGFS, supra note 26, at 4.
Innovations in credit risk transfer have widened the options available to credit risk
managers and have allowed banks to think about shaping their risk profile
independently of their origination business. In the first instance, this has often meant
seeking to reduce concentrations of credit risk to particular borrowers or market
segments.

Id.
84. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 33 (“Market risk . . . is the net exposure to
interest rates, foreign exchange rates, commodity prices, and equity prices.”).
85. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 16-17 (noting that market risk can be
measured by using the Value-at-Risk methodology).
86. See CHEW, supra note 68, at 126-27.
87. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 51 (“The interest rate risk element of the
bond can be removed by combining the bond with an interest rate swap . . . .”).
88. In an equity default swap, “the triggering event is the point when the reference
stock hits a specified low barrier” rather than a specified credit event. Id. at 68.
89. See, e.g., Feder, supra note 21, at 705 (introducing interest rate swap and
currency swap).
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the objective is realized when Bank A collects a specific amount of
interest on the market capitalization of $10 million from Bank C, and by
giving or taking the amount following a stock price change. For
example, if the stock price increases to $15, Bank A pays $5 million (a
$5 increase multiplied by one million shares). On the contrary, if the
price per stock decreases by $3, Bank C pays $3 million (a $3 decrease
multiplied by one million shares) to Bank A. Accordingly, Bank A
collects interest on the $10 million capital obligation (as there is a
market capitalization of one million shares). In return, it transfers the
gain or loss resulting from the increase or decrease of the stock price to
Bank C in its entirety, thereby hedging any stock price risk. This type of
TRS transaction is not very different from the structure and effect of a
typical “equity swap” transaction. 90
The transaction of credit derivatives instruments is one medium for
the creation of new profit. By taking over the credit risk, the assuming
party can realize a substantial income without investing its own capital
for the underlying asset. The “credit option,” whereby the option seller
receives a premium, is just such an example. 91 In the case of a TRS or
CDS, the party who assumes the credit risk benefits from the ensuing
compensation.
For example, Bank A agrees to an interest rate at LIBOR 92 +80 basis
points (“bp”) while providing a $1 million loan to Company B with the
expectation that the financial situation of Company B will deteriorate.
Bank A then signs the TRS agreement that requires Bank C to pay the
promised interest (LIBOR+30bp) and principal ($1 million) to Bank A
upon agreement that any income resulting from the underlying asset
(i.e., the loan provided to Company B) will be transferred to Bank C. A
one-time exchange takes place if the principal is paid in its entirety
within the maturity period. An exchange of interest takes place
90. See, e.g., id. at 706 (introducing equity swaps).
91. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 78.
Credit options are . . . bilateral OTC financial contracts. A credit option is a contract
designed to meet specific hedging or speculative requirements of an entity, which may
purchase or sell the option to meet its objectives. . . . By purchasing credit options,
banks and other [financial] institutions can take a view on credit spread movements
for the cost of the option premium only, without recourse to actual loans issued by an
obligor. The writer of credit options seeks to earn premium income.

Id.
92. LIBOR refers to the London Interbank Offered Rate. See BBA, BBA LIBOR –
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.bba.org.uk/bba/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=225&a=14
16 (last visited Mar. 11, 2008)); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 937 (8th ed. 2004).
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whenever interest is paid, so long as such interest is paid at a regular
interval, generally either quarterly or semi-annually. The principal is
then exchanged at the time of maturity. If Company B pays the interest
that corresponds to the LIBOR+80bp rate each time interest is paid,
Bank C will gain the income resulting from the 50bp difference every
time. This is equivalent to Bank C’s collection of the participation fee of
50bp for guaranteeing the performance of Company B’s loan obligation
to Bank A.
One might question whether Bank C’s assumption of risk creates a
new transaction. TRS transactions, guarantees, 93 and suretyships94
should be considered independent financial techniques for profit creation
for several reasons. First, in the case of a guarantee or suretyship, it is
customary for Company B to pay the participation fee while requesting
from Bank C the issuance of the certificate of guarantee. If Company B
defaults on the loan, Bank C, the obligor in the guarantee agreement,
pays the obligation on behalf of Company B and at the request of Bank
A, and so acquires the right of indemnity for Company B. Of course,
Bank C may issue a certificate of guarantee for Bank A absent Company
B’s request. Issuance of a certificate of guarantee by a bank without the
request of the principal debtor is referred to as “the guarantee not asked
for.” 95 One advantage of a TRS, however, is that it is possible to
produce the same effect as when a guarantee is obtained from Bank C
with Bank A’s independent business judgment, regardless of Company
B’s involvement. 96
Second, Bank C’s secured obligation becomes void when Bank A’s
loan for Company B is determined void, for whatever reason, even when
Bank C provided protection to Bank A with the intent to guarantee
performance. This is referred to as the secured obligation’s “appendant

93. See infra note 656 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 689-91 and
accompanying text.
94. See infra Part V.C.2.
95. See Aicher et al., supra note 81, at 910-11. This is a rare case. Generally,
[a] guaranty is a promise made by a guarantor to answer for the debt or obligation (the
“underlying debt”) of an obligor (the “principal”) that is owed to a creditor or other
obligee (the “underlying creditor” or “lender”). A guaranty is, therefore, a collateral
promise by the guarantor to pay the debt or obligation of the underlying obligor for
the benefit of the lender.

Id. (citation omitted).
96. Id.
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nature.” 97 However, the general rule is that Bank A’s collection on the
claim should be recognized since a TRS should not be considered a form
of guarantee, even though the legal standards may differ depending on
the specific conditions of the transaction. In this respect, a TRS has an
independent reason for existing. 98
Third, a TRS can be used other than as a guarantee. 99 Bank C can
create the same effect it would through stock investment merely by
paying interest on short-term investments and without putting in its own
capital. Therefore, a TRS is a new profit creation scheme that affords
the realization of various economic effects that could not be obtained
with the existing financial devices alone. 100
Additionally, products such as Credit Linked Notes (“CLN”) 101 can
be viewed as financial securitizations that are consolidating their
position in the worldwide market. Asset Backed Securitization
(“ABS”), 102 which has the effect of transferring credit risk to investors
by leveraging loan assets retained by financial institutions, or CLN’s,
which factor in credit risk, show that credit derivatives instrument

97. When the claim secured by a mortgage becomes extinct by completion of
prescription or for any other reason, the mortgage shall also lapse with it. See infra Part
V.C.2.
98. Whether a TRS is applicable to the rule of guarantee was a hidden-issue in the
litigation between Daehan Investment Trust Management and JP Morgan in the
Southern District of New York. See Complaint at 6, Daehan Inv. Trust Mgmt. Co. v.
J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No. 02 Civ. 1379 (CSH) at *6.1379, 2003 WL 21297304
[hereinafter DITM Complaint].
99. See DAS, supra note 33, at 11-12.
100. See, e.g., id. at 140-45.
101. See infra Part II.D.
102. In general, an ABS does not seem to be classified as a credit derivatives
instrument. However, ABS complies with the principle of non-recourse financing to
exchange/repay financial resources. The bonds are transferred to a company
specializing in securitization, with the transferring party of the asset not assuming any
obligation to pay back the principal to the investor. See George P. Miller, Regulatory
Developments in Securitization, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIZATION 2002, at
733, 760, 876-77 (2002). From this perspective, ABS, too, may be considered a cutting
edge financial method used to transfer credit risk, the essence of a credit derivatives
instrument transaction. However, it is also true that it is used to raise capital since it
uses methods such as taking over the subordinated notes by the asset transferring party
as a method for reinforcing credit. See id. at 760. However, if the asset transferring
party can completely cast away the credit risk by using methods such as appointing a
third party as guarantor to reinforce credit, the characteristics of the credit derivatives
instrument transaction will be altered accordingly. See id.
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transactions serve as catalysts for the financial securitization
phenomenon. 103
So long as the market continues to function properly, no one can
accurately forecast the limit on the growth of the new derivative
financial market. 104 It is conceivable that this market segment could
exceed the mainstream financial market in the near future. 105
II. DERIVATIVES SWAP MARKET TOOLS
Credit derivatives instruments are financial products derived from
the transaction of underlying assets such as foreign currencies, deposits,
bonds, and stocks. 106 This concept includes all transactions, whereby
underlying financial assets or the future value of liabilities are sold or
bought as they fluctuate according to FOREX exchange rates, interest
rates, or stock prices. 107 Derivatives are, as the term indicates, derived
from the original product. These derivatives are off-balance sheet
transactions, and do not generate asset or liability fluctuation or capital
settlement at the time of the transaction. 108 This type of transaction was
often used as a means to circumvent restrictions related to assets and
liabilities or spot transactions. 109 In general, they are classified as
The
futures, 110 forwards, 111 options, 112 and swap transactions.
103.
104.

See Smith, supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See Aicher et al., supra note 81, at 958 (“Obviously, no one knows exactly
what the future holds for credit default swaps. It does seem probable, however, that
their attractiveness is only likely to increase.”).
105. On April 18, 2007, the ISDA market survey reported that total “notional
amount outstanding” credit derivatives was $327.4 trillion with a “gross credit exposure
before netting estimated to be $8.8 trillion” as of December 31, 2006. Press Release,
ISDA, ISDA Publishes Year-End 2006 Market Survey (Apr. 18, 2007),
http://www.isda.org/press/press041807ms2006.html.
106. See DAS, supra note 33, at 9.
107. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 679-80.
108. See CHEW, supra note 68, at 62.
109. See id.
110. See DUBOFSKY & MILLER, supra note 11, at 126-28. Futures are products that
are traded on an exchange. In a futures transaction, a signed trading agreement
establishes a currency, interest, or stock price index with the product deliverable at the
preset price after the stated period of time. This is the opposed to the spot transaction
whereby product delivery and payment are both conducted when the transaction
agreement is signed. It is also different from the forward transaction where there is a
promise among the parties to deliver and assume products at a specified point in the
future. Futures transactions take place in standardized exchange. Id.
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transaction of financial derivatives was initially used to hedge the risk of
fluctuating asset value due to varying economic climates. They have
developed, however, into “high risk, high return” investments due to the
advanced financial engineering utilizing computer technologies. 113 The
risk of asset value fluctuation is more widely assumed because of highly
sophisticated, cutting edge financial methods. 114

111. See generally Feder, supra note 21, at 698-701 (explaining the procedure and
operation of forwards transactions). Forwards refer to the products that are transacted
outside of exchanges, where the target product is to be delivered and assumed at a
specific period in the future at the promised price. The forward exchange, which is a
type of forwards agreement, is the most traditional derivative. It is a transaction where
the sale or purchase of the currency occurs at a specific FOREX exchange rate and at a
specific time in the future. Both futures and forward transaction differ from the spot
transaction in that the transaction agreement for both futures and forwards is signed at
one point, but payment is not made until some future point. They are similar in the
sense that they are used to hedge risk that comes from price fluctuation. However,
forward transactions, unlike futures transactions, have no official exchange or
standardized production. All of these transactions entail delivery of a product, payment
at the point of settlement, and an exchange guarantee that is not part of the performance
on the transaction. Thus, this is a transaction that may be accomplished by the average
person, because it does not require warrant of money. Id.
112. See generally id. at 692-98 (explaining the procedure and operation of options
transactions). An option is a transaction in which one buys or sells the right to purchase
specific assets such as products or securities at a set price or within a specified period of
time. The right is sold or bought at and for the present. Options transfer the risk from
the buyer to the seller, with the option seller receiving a premium in return for assuming
risk. Within this type of transaction, there are both put options and call options. In the
case of a futures purchase, profit is generated when the price of the basic asset
increases, and loss results when the price goes down. In other words, the profit and loss
parallel price fluctuation. In the case of an option purchase, on the other hand, profits
are realized when the price of the underlying asset increases. Even when the price goes
down, however, no loss may exceed the premium. Therefore, the gain or loss is not
parallel with price fluctuation, because the exercise of the option is, in fact, optional.
The route that is more favorable to the option buyer is the one that will be utilized. In
exchange, a premium for the right is paid to the option seller. Id.
113. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 1.
114. See STEINHERR, supra note 62, at 17-25.
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A. Swap Generally
Swaps 115 are classified into two categories: “commodity swaps”
and “financial swaps.” Commodity swaps involve the targeted
swapping of crude oil, 116 grains, or other products. 117 “This swap
involve[s] the periodic payments by the first counterparty to the second
based on a fixed price of a specified amount of some commodity.”118
Financial swaps refer to the exchange of products such as foreign
currencies, bonds, stocks, and other financial assets and liabilities. 119
Financial swaps are then sub-classified as either “foreign currency
swaps,” “interest rate swaps,” or “equity swaps.” 120 Foreign currency
swaps include the composite buying and selling of foreign currency, as
in the purchase of a forward exchange at the same time that a spot
exchange is sold, or vice versa. 121 An interest rate swap involves
exchanging the flow of interest between two bonds with different
interest payment methods or with the same currency indicated. 122 It is
the so-called off-balance sheet transaction that does not accompany the
exchange of principal. 123 In particular, interest rate swaps are popular
because they involve bond issuance or mid- to long-term financing. 124 It
is customary for these transactions to be tied together, as opposed to
keeping them as independent proprietary transactions. Exchange of the
principal does not actually take place. 125 Instead, “[t]he amount of each
payment is calculated on the basis of a hypothetical, or ‘notional’
115. With regard to the swap, “[t]he terminology is further complicated by the U.S.
market’s use of the word ‘swap’ to refer to an exchange of one bond for another . . . and
the U.K. market’s use of the term ‘switch’ for the same transaction.” TAVAKOLI, supra
note 72, at 63.
116. See, e.g., Willa E. Gibson, Are Swap Agreements Securities or Futures?: The
Inadequacies of Applying the Traditional Regulatory Approach to OTC Derivatives
Transactions, 24 J. CORP. L. 379, 386 (1999).
117. See, e.g., DUBOFSKY & MILLER, supra note 11, at 317.
118. Gibson, supra note 116, at 384.
119. See CHANCE, supra note 40, at 560-64, 575-84, 627-31.
120. See id. at 627 (“In equity swaps one counterparty pays according to the
performance of a stock index. A typical equity swap would involve one side paying
interest according to LIBOR while the other side makes a payment based on the return
on the S&P 500 times the notional principal.”).
121. See, e.g., id. at 560-62.
122. See Gibson, supra note 116, at 384.
123. See CHANCE, supra note 40, at 575-84.
124. See Gibson, supra note 116, at 384-85.
125. See CHANCE, supra note 40, at 579.
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principal amount . . . .” 126 Meanwhile, an exchange of principal may
occur in a currency swap where a bond obligation with different
currencies is exchanged. 127 An interest rate swap, which is a mix of the
two, refers to a transaction that entails the exchange of an obligation or
assets. 128
As interest on credit risk increased beginning in the mid 1990s,
credit derivatives instruments related to credit risk began to appear en
masse with regard to the CDS. 129 CDS’s and TRS’s sold by JP Morgan,
a pivotal player in the financial derivatives arena, are noteworthy. 130 A
credit swap transaction applies the general interest swap technique to a
credit risk transaction in order to hedge risk following a change in
credit. 131 Cash flows change accordingly, depending on the change in
credit level. A credit swap entails dispersing credit risk among the
parties to a transaction according to a prearranged formula. 132
The assumption of an obligation is not part of a swap. 133 From a
legal standpoint, a swap transaction does not affect the relationship
between the obligee and obligor because it does not implicate the
assumption of any obligation, but rather merely creates an agreement “to
exchange cash flows.” 134 A swap does not entail a dischargeable or
duplicable assumption that involves undertaking the obligation of the
other party. Rather, only the specific cash flows of the obligation are
exchanged at some future date. 135 While the original obligor must repay
the obligee, the counterparty of the swap agreement still does not
assume the underlying obligation. Specifically, a swap transaction is not

126.
127.

MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 43.
See CHANCE, supra note 40, at 560; WHALEY, supra note 4, at 18; cf. CHEW,
supra note 68, at 7.
128. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 18. (“The cash flows of the two legs of a swap
can be linked to virtually any reference rate, asset price, or index level.”).
129. See DUBOFSKY & MILLER, supra note 11, at 320; see also CHOUDHRY, supra
note 56, at 5.
130. See Gibson, supra note 116, at 387-88 (citation omitted) (“Banks typically
purchase credit swaps to insure payment of a loan made to a client upon the client’s
default.”); see also MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 18.
131. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 54-58.
132. See DUBOFSKY & MILLER, supra note 11, at 8.
133. See CHANCE, supra note 40, at 560-64, 575-84, 627-31.
134.
See DUBOFSKY & MILLER, supra note 11, at 7.
135. See id. at 8.
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a trade that involves the obligee. Instead, it is an internal issue that
occurs between the obligation and the counterparty of the swap. 136
Generally, markets classify credit derivatives into single-name
derivatives and multi-name derivatives, which are classified depending
on either the reference asset-issuing institution or the number of the
reference entities. 137 Single-name credit derivatives issued by an
institution that has a reference asset include single-name CDS and TRS,
each having a relatively standardized product structure. 138 Multi-name
credit derivatives are issued by many reference entities, and they target
bond or loan assets. These derivatives include basket default swaps
(“BDS”), portfolio default swaps (“PDS”) and synthetic collateralized
debt obligations (“CDO”). On the other hand, a CLN may involve many
reference entities that are the target of credit risk. 139
This Article next examines the basic structure of popular singlename credit derivatives such as CDS’s and TRS’s, and prevalent multiname credit derivatives such as CLN’s, BDS’s, PDS’s, and synthetic
CDO’s.
B. Credit Default Swap
Generally, “[c]redit default swaps began as instruments for
managing credit risk.” 140 A single-name CDS is a mutual agreement
whereby the protection buyer (the credit risk seller), pays either a onetime premium to the protection seller (the credit risk buyer or the
investor), or, if a credit event occurs in the reference entity, makes
periodic payments in exchange for all or part of the loss. 141 If an agreedupon credit event such as bankruptcy or default occurs, the protection
seller must compensate for the value of the lost reference asset. 142 This
can be achieved through the payment of cash (i.e., cash settlement), or
by purchasing the reference asset at face value, despite the applicable
reference asset’s decline in value (i.e., physical settlement). 143

136. See Aicher et al., supra note 81, at 955 (comparing credit default swap with
guaranties and insurance).
137. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 681.
138. Id. at 681-85 (describing credit products market by pie chart).
139. See, e.g., infra Part II.D.
140. See Aicher et al., supra note 81, at 954.
141. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 6, 68.
142. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 47.
143. See id. at 69.
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In a CDS, the agreed-upon principal (i.e., the amount of protection
against loss), is not paid when the transaction is signed. 144 Thus, a CDS
is an unfunded structure that is not accompanied by capital-raising. 145 A
CDS is different from a TRS, which will be examined below, in the
sense that the protection seller merely assumes the credit risk and does
not assume the market risk, the price risk of the reference asset. 146 The
CDS is the most fundamental structure of the swap, and hence is also
referred to as a “vanilla” CDS. 147
Like other credit derivatives, a credit event for a CDS triggers the
protection seller’s obligation to repay the reference asset to the
protection buyer in exchange for a premium. 148 Therefore, a credit event
plays an important role in the CDS agreement. 149 A standard CDS
transaction typically complies with the categories of credit events that
are defined by the ISDA. 150
A premium is the price of a credit derivative, and is determined by
a floating interest rate used to hedge the interest fluctuation risk.151
Premiums are determined by factors such as the reference entity, the
protection seller’s credit risk, the expected “recovery rate” 152 of the
principal if a credit event occurs, and conditions in the financial
144. See id. at 54 (explaining that the protection buyer agrees to make periodic
payments over a predetermined number of years (the maturity of the CDS) to the
protection seller).
145. See DOMINIC O’KANE ET AL., LEHMAN BROS., THE LEHMAN BROTHERS GUIDE
TO EXOTIC CREDIT DERIVATIVES 7 (2003).
146. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 61.
147. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 68.
148. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 54-55.
149. See Aicher et al., supra note 81, at 954-55 (“In a credit default swap, two
parties agree that the protection seller will pay to the protection buyer certain amounts
upon the occurrence of a credit event with respect to a reference entity and satisfaction
of the relevant conditions to payment or . . . settlement.”) (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
150. See id. at 954 (“Credit default swaps are often documented using ISDA form
agreements and by incorporation of standard definitions applicable to credit default
swaps published by ISDA.”).
151. See Jorge A. Chan-Lau, Anticipating Credit Events Using Credit Default
Swaps, with an Application to Sovereign Debt Crises (IMF, Working Paper No.
WP/03/106, 2003).
152. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 15 (“The percentage of the original loan that
is received back [when a corporation enters into liquidation, winding-up or dissolution]
is known as the recovery rate, which is defined as the percentage of par value that is
returned to the creditor.”) (emphasis omitted).
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markets. 153 The protection seller’s credit risk refers to the concern that
the agreement will not be performed because of bankruptcy or other
event. 154 This is often referred to as the counterparty risk. 155
An increase in the credit risk of the reference entity, a decrease in
the protection seller’s credit risk, and a reduced recovery rate for the
underlying asset when the credit event occurs may increase premiums. 156
Curtailing the reference entity’s moral hazard and monitoring the
management situation may lower premiums. 157 For example, premiums
decrease when there are special clauses, such as covenants, prohibiting
management activities that might decrease financial viability, or
requirements that the reference entity provide management information
such as a corporate bond. 158
Overall, a CDS is the medium for transferring the protection
buyer’s credit risk position to the protection seller. 159 A reference asset
holder signs the CDS agreement as a way to replace the reference
entity’s credit risk with the protection seller’s credit risk, i.e. the
counterparty risk, for a specific period of time, by paying a fixed
premium to the protection seller. 160 For example, banks use CDS’s to
sell only the credit spread, which means that they sell the credit risk
without selling the retained asset. 161
In order for a bank to adjust its degree of exposure to credit risk, it
must notify the original counterparty in advance to obtain consent. 162
This can result in considerable harm to customer relations and risk
management. When a CDS merely separates the credit risk of the
reference entity, however, there is no duty to notify the original
153. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 73. (“[T]he higher the credit risk associated with
the entity, the higher the price of protection.”).
154. See id. at 71-72.
155. See id. at 15.
156. See id. at 78-80.
157. See id. at 136 (“One manifestation of the moral hazard problem is the concern
that the bank may make riskier loans than otherwise if it knows that it can then transfer
all of the associated credit risk to CDO investors.”).
158. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 101-02 (discussing the factors that determine
value of premium).
159. See O’KANE ET AL., supra note 145, at 4.
160. See id. at 4-5; BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 54-55.
161. See O’KANE ET AL., supra note 145, at 4-5; BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 54-55.
162. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 58. In rolling maturity swaps and constant
maturity swaps, the contract party can freely and periodically reset the maturity date
and swap the premium at each roll date. Id.
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counterparty. Therefore, it is possible for a bank to adjust its degree of
exposure to the credit risk while still avoiding a customer relations
problem. 163 From the bank’s perspective, it is possible to separate
customer relationship and risk management, since the outcome allows
for securitization of the credit asset without removing it from the
balance sheet. 164
C. Total Return Swap
A Total Return Swap is a bilateral financial agreement whereby one
party of an agreement (the total return payer or beneficiary) promises to
deliver whole numbers of specific cash flow (LIBOR + spread) derived
from the reference asset (securities with bank loan or credit risk) to the
counterparty (total return receiver or investor) in return for assuming the
risk related to the investor’s financial assets. 165 Accordingly, a TRS
provides the means for managing risk by transferring the market and
credit risk of the reference asset to the investor. From the investor’s
point of view, a TRS provides the means for collecting cash flow
without buying the reference asset in person. 166 Thus, it is possible to
create the effect of a direct investment on the reference asset. Because
the investor receives return from the reference asset, the economic effect
is the same as possessing the reference asset without owning it. 167
Therefore, a TRS has the legal characteristics of a synthetic long
position in a loan or security. 168
The agreement terminates when the credit event fails to occur prior
to the maturity of the TRS. 169 If a credit event occurs prior to maturity,
however, the investor must either settle the loss resulting from the credit
event with cash or buy the reference asset, thereby undertaking a
physical settlement at that agreed-upon amount, known as the “nominal
163. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 41 (“Credit derivatives allow investors to
manage the credit risk exposure of their portfolios or asset holdings, essentially by
providing insurance against a deterioration in credit quality of the borrowing entity.”).
164. See id. at 45.
165. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 82; see also TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 20.
166. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 20 (“The total rate of return payer is the legal
owner of the reference asset . . . [and] holds the reference asset on its balance sheet.”).
167. See JANET TAVAKOLI, INTRODUCTION TO CREDIT DERIVATIVES TOTAL RETURN
SWAPS-TRS, 2-3 (2001), available at http://www.tavakolistructuredfinance.com/TRS.p
df [hereinafter “TAVAKOLI, TRS”].
168. See id. at 3.
169. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 92.

2008

VANILLA SWAPS TO EXOTIC CREDIT DERIVATIVES

733

amount”. 170 Compared to the CDS, in which the payment to offset a
loss is made only when the credit event occurs, a TRS factors in the
reference asset’s market value during a normal circumstance. This
allows for the generation of cash flow between beneficiary and investor
regardless of whether the credit event occurs. Put more precisely, a TRS
and CDS are different in the sense that the investor pays “LIBOR +
spread” to the payer of total return in exchange for undertaking the total
return. Therefore, market risk, here the price risk of the reference asset,
is taken on in addition to credit risk. 171
The payer of total return who buys protection through a TRS can be
protected from the credit and market risks even when the reference asset
is not sold during a specific period of time. As one author explains,
“[t]he payer in a TRS creates a hedge for both price risk and default risk
of the reference asset, although the payer in the TRS is a legal owner of
the reference asset.” 172 If a credit event occurs prior to the maturity of
the TRS, the payer of total return is compensated by the receiver of total
return for the loss in the form of a cash settlement or physical settlement
in an amount previously agreed upon. 173 If a credit event fails to occur
prior to the maturity of the TRS, an amount equal to the change in the
reference asset’s market value is paid either (a) to the receiver of total
return from the payer of total return, or (b) from the total return receiver
to the total return payer. 174 A TRS, then, helps to remove the reference
asset from the total return payer’s balance sheet during the period of the
agreement. 175
The payer of total return, such as a bank with a high credit rating,
uses the capital raised with LIBOR interest to obtain balance sheet assets
like loan securities. 176 The bank then receives LIBOR + spread in
exchange for transferring the resulting return to the investor. 177
Therefore, it is possible to generate non-risk profit up to the level of the

170.
171.
172.
173.

See id. at 92-94.
See Feder, supra note 21, at 712.
TAVAKOLI, TRS, supra note 167, at 4.
See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, at art. III, §§ 3.1-3.10 for the
whole process of the settlement.
174. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 20.
175. See id. at 21 (“The [TRS] . . . is an off-balance sheet transaction, and the
reference asset does not appear on the balance sheet of the receiver.”).
176. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 71-74.
177. See id.
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spread. 178 The LIBOR + spread that the investor pays to the payer of
total return is the capital raised with LIBOR interest by the payer of total
return. Thus, it can be taken for the premium paid in exchange for
buying the reference asset on behalf of the investor. With a TRS,
therefore, an investor can benefit from the return generated from the
reference asset without actually raising the capital to buy the reference
asset. 179 Moreover, the relatively short-term maturity of the TRS is
more beneficial than the long-term maturity of the reference asset,
allowing investors to raise capital for the short-term with low interest
and continue to use it over the long-term with high interest.
D. Credit Linked Notes
In a CLN transaction, the protection buyer signs a CDS agreement
with the dealer, known as the CLN issuer or special purpose vehicle
(“SPV”), based on a reference asset such as a retained loan. 180 A CLN is
issued to the investor who, in essence, is the protection seller. 181 The
CLN issuer will then pay a fixed interest or floating coupon up to the
protection fee. 182
In the CDS, only the protection premium is given and received
without the burden of raising capital for the principal. 183 With a CLN,
the investor pays for the principal of the first bond issued. 184 Thus, a
CLN has a structure that is accompanied by raising capital. 185 The
principal paid by the investor to the dealer plays the role of securing the
performance of protection. Therefore, if a credit event occurs, the CLN
investor receives the remaining balance after deducting compensation
for the loss in the middle of the contract period (cash settlement) or
178. See TAVAKOLI, TRS, supra note 167, at 3.
In a very [strict] . . . sense, TRS are not credit derivatives. TRS, considered in their
most basic form, are funding cost arbitrages. TRS are applied in a variety of ways:
balance sheet management, portfolio management, hedge fund leverage, and asset
swap maturity manipulation. While the overall effect of a TRS may have very
important credit implications for both the payer and receiver of the total rate of return
swap, the use is primarily that of a financing.

Id. (emphasis omitted).
179. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 20.
180. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 116.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 115.
183. See id. at 55.
184. See id. at 115.
185. See O’KANE ET AL., supra note 145, at 7.
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acquiring the underlying asset at face value (physical settlement). 186 If a
credit event does not occur, the total principal is paid back. 187 Basically,
a CLN is a more structured product than the CDS. The use of the SPV
makes it possible to eliminate counterparty risk and indirect investment
in the credit risk, allowing investors who were previously restricted by
regulations or transaction costs to do so directly using a CDS. 188
Meanwhile, institutions that issue CLNs are not restricted by
specific regulations. 189 Rather, the structure issued by the SPV is typical
in the financial market, where the SPV secures credit risk via the
underlying asset of the CLN and enters into a CDS agreement with the
reference asset owner. 190 Accordingly, a CLN can be considered a type
of financing device linked to a secured CDS or CDS. 191
In sum, the CLN issuer uses a CLN as a means for hedging credit
risk and provides protections to the protection buyer through the CDS
transaction. 192 On the other hand, the investor puts money in to gain the
higher interest rate of the CLN. 193 In general, the coupon rate of the
CLN is higher than that of the regular bond issued by the dealer or SPV,
the CLN issuer. 194 Since it is issued at a discounted rate, 195 the CLN can
be an attractive investment for investors who seek a higher return from
their investment strategy. 196

186. See Feder, supra note 21, at 715 (“If the arrangement is cash-settled, the note
issuer will deduct a stipulated credit-default amount from the principal. If the
arrangement is physically-settled, the note issuer will deliver the reference asset to the
note holder, instead of redeeming with cash.”).
187. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 115 (stating that a value less than par,
however, will be paid to the investor).
188. Id. at 121 (“The majority of CLNs are issued directly by banks and corporates
[sic] in the same way as conventional bonds.”).
189. See id. at 116 n.2.
190. See id. at 118.
191. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 694.
192. See Feder, supra note 21, at 716 (“As in the case of a credit default swap,
credit-linked debt transfers only credit risk.”).
193. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 116 (“The [CLNs] are often used by
borrowers to hedge against credit risk, and by investors to enhance the yield received on
their holdings.”).
194. See id. at 121.
195. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 695.
196. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 46-47 (arguing the advantages and
disadvantages of CLNs).
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E. Basket Default Swap
Unlike single-name CDS’s that target one single-reference asset,
the Basket Default Swap is a form of CDS that creates a pool of manyreference assets. 197 According to the likely order in which credit events
will occur, these risks are classified into categories such as “first-todefault basket” swaps, “second-to-default basket” swaps, and so on.198
In a sense, it is the same as the CDS because the protection buyer pays a
specific premium to the protection seller and the protection seller
compensates the protection buyer for the loss if a credit event occurs. 199
It differs from a CDS, however, in the sense that there is not only one
reference entity that issues the reference asset, but rather may include
five, ten, twenty or more reference entities. 200
The protection seller of a BDS transaction compensates for losses
only for the credit events in the order (e.g., first, second, third, etc.)
agreed upon in advance, and then the agreement is terminated. 201 For
example, the protection seller of the “first-to-default basket” swap
transaction is responsible for the compensation of the credit risk only for
the first credit event, even if more than one credit event occurs within
the basket. 202 In other words, the protection seller pays the protection
buyer for the applicable loss when the first credit event occurs that
satisfies the agreed-upon terms, and then the agreement is terminated.
Likewise, in the case of a “second-to-default basket” swap, the
protection buyer is protected by the protection seller only for the
occurrence of the second credit event among the reference entities in the
basket. 203 Calculation of the premium for the BDS is significantly
197.
198.

See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 99.
See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 59, 62-66 (illustrating a basket credit default

swap).
199. See id.
200. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 158 (“Basket structures are generally best
suited for investment-grade credits with low correlations and low covariance.”).
201. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 126-29.
202. See O’KANE ET AL., supra note 145, at 8 (“The advantage of a FTD basket
[swap] is that it enables an investor to earn a higher yield than any of the credits in the
basket.”)
203. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 160-61 (“The [ ] protection seller will make a
payment on only one of the credits, not on all [reference asset], so the protection seller
is compensated for only one default plus the increased likelihood of a defaulting
occurring.”). Generally, “a first-to-default basket (n=1) is riskier than a second-todefault basket.” See O’KANE ET AL., supra note 145, at 9.
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influenced by the CDS’s average premium that targets the individual
issuing institution, the number of institutions issuing reference assets, 204
and the correlation of credit risk between the reference asset issuing
institutions. 205 In addition, “[a]ny theoretical model of pricing basket
swaps would include the following key inputs: . . . probability of default
of reference entities and protection seller . . . [and] maturity of swap and
expected recovery value of the reference entities.” 206 Deciding on the
premium rate of a certain default basket is a very complex task. A great
deal of research is currently being conducted in this area. 207
F. Portfolio Default Swap
The Portfolio Default Swap is a structured financial product similar
to the BDS. 208 The number of institutions that issue reference assets is
considerably higher (between forty and one hundred), and the limit for
the compensation is not based on the order in which the credit events
occur. Rather, the limit for the compensation is determined by a ratio in
the portfolio that is an amount agreed upon in advance. 209 For example,
an agreed upon credit risk of the protection seller may be 10%.
Therefore, the PDS transaction insulates the protection buyer from a loss
of up to 10% of the portfolio assets that results from credit events
occurring on the reference portfolio. Any loss exceeding this percentage
would not be covered. 210
Likewise, assume there is a “second-loss piece” PDS transaction
that is signed to guarantee loss from a credit event that exceeds 10% of
the portfolio asset. In this case, the protection seller is not responsible
for the loss within the agreed-upon 10% that results from credit events,
but protects the protection buyer for any portion that exceeds 10%.
Accordingly, a PDS can be structured into various tiers with different
risk profiles. This is similar to the way an ABS is issued for various

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 101.
See id. at 102.
See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 86.
See id. at 89.
See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 107.
See id. at 107-10.
See id. at 107-08.
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tranches, 211 such as senior, mezzanine, and equity—each with a different
risk profile. 212
Like a BDS, a PDS’s premium rate is influenced significantly by
the “correlation of credit risk” 213 among the reference assets. From the
investor’s point of view, a PDS restricts the actual assumption of loss
because the maximum loss is agreed upon in advance. Leverage is
provided to the investment in credit risk and provides the means for a
high return. 214 From the protection buyer’s point of view, a PDS
provides the medium for transferring considerable credit risk to the
protection seller with relative ease. 215 In other words, it is more
convenient for the protection buyer to use a PDS transaction instead of
individual CDS transactions with the protection seller of the reference
asset that is in the portfolio. Moreover, if the protection buyer wants
partial protection on the entire portfolio, a PDS provides a relatively
cost-effective means.
G. Synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligation
A Synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligation is a structured financial
product 216 which generates cash flow. It is similar to the traditional cash
CDO because it uses the transaction of a credit derivative, such as a
credit swap, to transfer the credit risk inherent in reference assets, such
as a majority of the loan obligations and regular corporate bonds, to the
separately established SPV. 217 This intermediary 218 issues securities

211.
212.
213.

See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 695 n.13.
See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 135-36.
See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 20 (“Correlation is a measure of the degree to
which a value of one variable is related to the value of another. . . . It is particularly
important in the measurement of the variance (hence volatility) of a portfolio.”).
214. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 110.
215. See id.
216. O’KANE ET AL., supra note 145, at 12 (“[S]ynthetic CDOs . . . were conceived
in 1997 as a flexible and low-cost mechanism for transferring credit risk off bank
balance sheets.”).
217. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 95 (“The critical difference between this
structure and a traditional CDO is that, unlike a typical CDO, a synthetic securitization
does not purchase underlying assets like bonds or loans, but rather references them by
way of credit default swaps.”) (quotation marks omitted). Generally, SPVs are
incorporated as a form of paper company in tax and regulatory havens such as Cayman
Island and Bermuda. See id. at 47.
218. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 695.
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with different credit levels that are linked with the credit risk to sell to
the investors. 219 Namely, synthetic CDO’s can broadly be defined as the
transfer of credit risk plus a cash CDO, consisting of tranches. 220
From the perspective of the reference asset holder, a synthetic CDO
differs from the traditional cash CDO because actual cash inflow does
not occur as it does for the traditional cash CDO. 221 The reference
asset’s credit risk shifts to the investor, however, who realizes the goal
of securitization—the conversion of reference assets into a cash
equivalent asset. This is called synthetic securitization. 222
A traditional, non-synthetic cash CDO is issued when the SPV
assigns the loan obligation itself from the asset holder. 223 On the other
hand, a synthetic CDO does not entail an actual transfer of the loan
obligation to the SPV by the asset holder. Instead, credit derivatives
such as a credit swap, CLN, or TRS are used to separate out the credit
risk of the loan obligation to transfer to the SPV. In other words, a
synthetic CDO merely transfers the credit risk of the reference asset to
the SPV and an investor, without transferring the legal ownership of the
reference asset to the SPV. 224
Meanwhile, the synthetic CDO is used mainly as a “balance sheet
CDO” and “arbitrage synthetic CDO.” 225 These two types of CDO’s
essentially share the same structure. The major difference between them
is the identity of the participants to the transaction and the purpose of the
transaction. Typically, banks or other single financial companies that
own reference assets sponsor balance sheet synthetic CDO’s, and they
issue synthetic CDO’s for hedging purposes. 226 On the other hand,
sponsors of the arbitrage synthetic CDO are one of several asset

219.
220.
221.
222.

See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 133.
See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 695-97.
See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 133-37.
See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 95 (“Investors purchasing one of the
various risks can tailor their risk exposure to this large and diversified credit portfolio
through tranches of a synthetic securitization.”).
223. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 7, at 1028.
224. See MARK J. P. ANSON ET AL., CREDIT DERIVATIVES: INSTRUMENTS,
APPLICATIONS, AND PRICING 140 (2004).
225. See STANDARD & POOR’S, GLOBAL CASH FLOW AND SYNTHETIC CDO CRITERIA
6 (2002).
226. BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 136. According to one expert, “banks’ desire to free
up regulatory capital through balance-sheet CDOs was an important driver of CDO
market activity in the 1990s.” Id.
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management companies that may or may not own reference assets. 227
The goal of the arbitrage synthetic CDO essentially is to gain the
difference 228 that results from the price discrepancy between the regular
bond market and credit derivatives market. 229
The balance sheet synthetic CDO is classified into funded and
unfunded structures depending on each investor’s position. 230 The
funded structure, accompanied by raising capital, exists if the investors
purchase CDO bonds in cash. 231 The SPV then uses the capital to
purchase swap collateral. In contrast, unfunded structures are not
accompanied by capital-raising, do not involve the acquisition of swap
collateral, and have a structure whereby investors assume the loss that
results from a credit event in the reference asset. 232
The most likely motive for issuing a synthetic CDO is that the
financial institutions that own reference assets can remove the credit risk
for the reference assets without notifying or obtaining consent from the
counterparty. 233 This is done by attaching credit derivatives within the
CDO structure. A traditional balance sheet CDO requires notification
and approval from the debtor before the loan obligation can be
transferred to the SPV. 234 On the other hand, the process of notifying or
obtaining approval from the debtor is not necessary for the synthetic
CDO transaction, since there is no actual transfer of the reference
asset. 235
The synthetic CDO was initially invented to accommodate the
balance sheets of European banks because of the traditional belief that
selling a customer’s loan obligation would have a negative effect on

227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 137.
See ANSON ET AL., supra note 224, at 133.
See id.
See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 136. Banks use this transaction tool in order to
remove assets from their balance sheets. WHALEY, supra note 4, at 696.
231. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 134 (“To fund the purchase of the loan portfolio,
the issuer sells debt obligations (notes) to investors.”); see also WHALEY, supra note 4,
at 696 (“The sponsor of the CDO usually sets the size of the senior class so that it can
attain a triple-A rating.”).
232. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 36.
233. See STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 225, at 5, 13 (arguing sponsoring
institution’s motivation of synthetic CDO).
234. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 137 (It is because “many bank loans are
inherently illiquid.”).
235. See ANSON ET AL., supra note 224, at 140.
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customer relations. 236 Today, some nations are demanding fuller
disclosure of the reference asset portfolio as a way to protect investors
against synthetic CDOs, as well as narrowly defining the scope of the
credit event. 237 Compared to the first synthetic CDO transactions, there
is now better protection for investors because of the improvements that
have been made. 238
For the asset holder, another advantage of synthetic CDOs is the
potential to curtail the unnecessary raising of funds. When an unfunded
structure is used that is not accompanied by formal capital raising, the
asset holder benefits from the mitigation of regulated capital while
transferring only the credit risk on the reference asset. Besides the BIS
ratio, 239 transfer of the loan asset waives both the mandatory procedure
of satisfying the countermeasure and the cost, prevents the leaking of
customers’ confidential information, and might also eliminate the
burden of exercising the right of the mortgage. 240
In addition, a CDO issued by the SPV in connection with the
synthetic CDO offers a favorable term to the investor since the coupon
rate is high compared to the interest rate of the AAA-rated regular
floated rate note 241 as long as a credit event does not occur. This high
return, however, is only compensation for payment protection. Thus, the
investor needs to remember that credit risk management is the key to
investment. 242 As for the basic issuance structure of the synthetic CDO,
it is comprised of three classes that are different in terms of the degree of
236.
237.
238.

See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 139.
See CGFS, supra note 26, at 2, 25-29.
See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 7, at 1027-31. Professors Partnoy and Skeel,
however, warned that “[t]he transaction costs associated with CDOs are very high, and
there is reason to believe that the potential benefits of CDOs . . . are not real.” Id. at
1040-41.
239. The BIS ratio gives an indication of the solvency of a bank. It gives the ratio
between the risk-bearing capital and the risk-weighted assets. See BizTerms.net,
http://www.bizterms.net/term/BIS-ratio.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
240. See id. at 1027-31 (arguing the benefits of CDOs).
241. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 7, at 1028-29.
242. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 8. Sometimes, the synthetic CDO is called an
investor-driven product. Market experts believe “[t]he advantage of CDOs is that by
changing the details of the tranche in terms of its attachment point (this is the amount of
subordination below the tranche) and width, it is possible to customize the risk profile
of a tranche to the investor’s specific profile.” O’KANE ET AL., supra note 145, at 13. Of
course, “[a] synthetic CDO offers further diversification by enabling investors to invest
in a diversified portfolio of credit default swaps.” Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 7, at
1031.
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exposure to the credit risk. 243 That is, a synthetic CDO has a structure
whereby the loss-generating risk of the reference asset is applied
sequentially depending on the seniority of each tier. 244 If the company
loan included in the reference asset portfolio defaults due to bankruptcy,
the loss is first assumed by the equity investor, 245 followed by the
mezzanine investor, the owner of the mezzanine tranche, and finally, the
senior investor, the owner of the senior tranche. 246
III. OPERATING MECHANISMS OF CREDIT DERIVATIVE SWAPS
A swap refers to a transaction whereby specific products, financial
assets, or liabilities are exchanged with the counterparty’s products,
assets, or liabilities on a specific day or during a specific period in the
future. 247 A swap transaction is the dealing of future assets and
liabilities, and is a type of forward transaction. In addition, the
transaction is an over-the-counter transaction rather than an officially
recognized exchange. 248 Originally, a swap was the product of financial
engineering, first occurring between different currencies. Subsequently,
interest swaps developed, eventually followed by the implementation of
commodity swaps. 249
Recently, the use of swaps expanded to the stock markets. 250 A
company or financial institution undertakes a swap transaction because
it seeks a “comparative advantage” in terms of lending. This
comparative advantage is characterized as the difference between
lending costs and investment gains that exist among the foreign currency
market, short-term financial markets, long-term capital markets, and the
various financial markets existing within the same region or between

243.
244.
245.

See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 135.
See id.
See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 696. When an equity investor in the synthetic
CDO assumes high default risk, it is sometimes called “toxic waste.” Id.
246. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 135-36.
247. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 679-85.
248. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 36-41; see also GEOFFERY POITRAS, RISK
MANAGEMENT, SPECULATION, AND DERIVATIVE SECURITIES 10 (2002).
249. See generally BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 53-58 (for asset swaps), at 67-73 (for
credit default swaps), at 83-87 (for total return swaps), at 99-101 (for basket default
swaps), at 107-10 (for portfolio default swaps); see also CHEW, supra note 68, at 10;
WHALEY, supra note 4, at 637-38, 648-53.
250. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 17-25; see also WHALEY, supra note 4, at 11-19.
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multiple regions. 251 As swap transactions become more prominent, the
differences between these markets tend to decrease. Thus, in the end,
swap transactions play a role in integrating international financial
markets. 252
A CDS is the standardized financial agreement that transfers credit
risk among the parties of a transaction. 253 It is the most important and
popular tool used in the credit derivatives instrument market. 254
Essentially, the CDS is the device that transfers credit risk from one
party to a specified counter-party within the parameters of a bilateral
OTC agreement entered into by the parties. 255 A CDS thus has an effect
similar to a guaranty of payment.
As examined above, companies and financial institutions today are
exposed to uncertain business factors. 256 In particular, exposure to the
counterparty’s credit risk is increasing. 257 This phenomenon is a reality
from which companies simply cannot escape. Therefore, companies or
financial institutions should focus not on escaping credit risk, but rather
on effectively managing this inevitable credit risk. The following subsection examines the legal characteristics of the transaction of a credit
derivatives instrument, particularly the CDS.
A. Bilateral Agreements
A credit derivatives instrument transaction is an agreement by
which all or part of the third party’s (the original obligor’s) credit risk
251. See DECOVNY, supra note 74, at 2.
252. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 679-85. One writer emphasizes that:
The key to [derivatives] investment management is to minimize risk while
maximizing return. In theory, for every risk appetite there is an “efficient frontier” of
returns. This is sort of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) of investment management.
Below the DMZ one is safe-too safe to win the war against [fluctuation of value]. . . .
Credit derivatives are a tool to help move the DMZ farther into risky territory without
taking more casualties. Specifically, credit derivatives can help diversity the credit
risk of a portfolio to dampen the volatility of potential returns.

TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 8.
253. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 687-90.
254. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 67.
255. See id. at 67-70.
256. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 1.
257. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 33 (“Counterparty risk . . . is the mark-tomarket exposure for the credit derivative due to the possibility that the counterparty
may default on their obligation or potential obligation under the terms of the credit
derivative transaction.”).
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inherent in the underlying asset is transferred from the third party to the
party that actually assumes the credit risk. 258 This risk is encompassed
in financial transactions such as loans or investments in securities. In
other words, a credit derivatives instrument is a device for transferring
credit risk between two parties through a bilateral agreement. That is, it
refers to a counter-agreement that transfers specific credit risk resulting
from a financial transaction to the other entity under specific conditions.
From an economic point of view, a credit derivatives transaction
can be referred to as a means of buying and selling the quantified
economic value of the credit risk. An agreement can be reached on the
combination of various risks to use, including collateralized debt
obligations or on a single risk. Accordingly, credit derivatives
instruments are based on financial assets or cash flow. 259 If default
occurs, the asset value is offset up to the maturity of the applicable
reference asset. 260 Alternatively, cash flow is performed on behalf of the
counterparty of the applicable transaction.
While its function appears to be similar to that of a suretyship or
guaranty, a credit derivatives transaction is legally defined as a nonspecific atypical agreement, and thus is not regulated by statute. This
characteristic offsets loss through built-in conditions that can be met
through the occurrence of a credit event. 261 Generally, the 1999 ISDA
definitions prescribe the designation of this agreement in credit
derivatives instruments and ISDA swap documents. 262
B. OTC Transactions
Credit derivatives instruments developed through four techniques
known as forwards, 263 futures, 264 options, 265 and swaps. 266 These
generally can be classified into two categories, depending on the type of
transaction: “exchange-traded products” transacted within the

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 679.
See DAS, supra note 33, at 7-12; see also BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 123.
See DAS, supra note 33, at 14.
See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 679.
See infra Part III.I.
See supra text accompanying note 111.
See supra text accompanying note 110.
See supra text accompanying note 112.
See supra Part II.A.
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exchanges 267 and “over-the-counter products” transacted one-to-one
between parties without use of an exchange. 268 Among the OTC
transactions, the options include the “floor deal type OTC products,” 269
which have a relatively simple format, and “structured OTC
products,” 270 which are transacted by developing complex structures
depending on the situation. According to this classification, stock price
index futures and stock price index options that are traded at the
securities exchange can be classified as the financial products that derive
from an exchange. 271 The forward exchange agreement or interest swap
agreement, transacted with a one-to-one agreement between the parties,
is a regular “floor deal type OTC product.” 272
Credit derivatives instrument agreements may be executed as OTC
transactions depending on special needs, but many such agreements
comply with standardized methods. 273 Credit derivatives instruments
are generally transacted as off-balance sheet transactions, 274 but there are
also balance-sheet transactions that are conducted using CLNs. 275 The
parties can ensure significant flexibility for leverage due to the nature of
the off-balance sheet transaction. 276 That is, as the investment is made
on the credit itself, it is possible to set the degree of leverage that the
investor wants. Traditionally, hedge fund or non-bank financial
institutions faced obstacles while attempting to invest in loan obligations
due to the absence of the repo market and high cost of managing the
loan obligations. 277 Today, they can invest in loan obligations by using
credit derivatives instruments such as over-the-counter TRSs.

267.
268.
269.

See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 27-33.
See id. at 16.
See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 36-41 (introducing G-30’s derivatives
contracts).
270. See STEINHERR, supra note 62, at 83-85 (introducing structured notes and
Tesobono swaps); see also MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 59-62.
271. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 27, 31, 33.
272. See CHANCE, supra note 40, at 572-81.
273. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 7, at 25 (“The rapid standardization of credit
default swaps may benefit existing market makers by increasing the volume of their
credit default swaps practice, for instance, but the reduction in transaction costs also
benefits other parties.”).
274. See CHEW, supra note 68, at 62.
275. See supra note 176 and accompanying text; see also Bomfim, supra note 1, at
8.
276. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 46.
277. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 23, 57.
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C. Diverse Reference Entity
Economic or reference entities that become subject to credit risk
vary widely, as they might include financial institutions, public entities,
the government, and general companies. 278 In the case of banks, if a
loan is granted to a specific company, it is possible to use a credit
derivatives instrument to disperse the company’s risk of bankruptcy or
default. A bank can then assume the risk and still have the power to
make profit by dealing the product between the parties through a credit
derivatives instrument. If a certain nation or company is considered to
have a high credit risk, it is possible for worldwide investors to hedge
risk by leveraging credit derivatives instruments. 279 Credit derivatives
instruments aim to hedge the default risk of a specific economic entity,
but sometimes can be used to hedge the risk of non-performance of a
specific duty.
D. Separation of Notes and Risk
The most prominent characteristic of the credit derivatives
instrument is the separation of the capital raising method and the credit
risk. 280 The parties to an agreement can change their degree of credit
risk exposure by using a credit derivatives instrument without actually
buying or selling a bond in the financial markets. 281 From a securities
structuring point of view, this is closely related to the distribution of
cash flow, risk, and management power. Moreover, a credit derivatives
instrument is a financial product that can transfer risk and still retain an

278. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 3; see also supra text accompanying note
2; WHALEY, supra note 4, at 684 tbl.19.1 (citing top 25 reference entities appearing in
credit derivative contracts in 2003 by gross dollars sold and gross dollars purchased).
279. See ROMAIN G. RANCIERE, CREDIT DERIVATIVES IN EMERGING MARKETS 8
(2001). The foreign investors who invested in the bonds issued by the Korean
Development Bank during the end of 1997, when the Korean economy was in a crisis,
hedged the sovereign risk of Korea through the credit derivatives instrument
transaction. Generally, “[b]roker dealers, which provide the market with liquidity, are
mainly the major investment banks involved in the emerging bond market (Deutsche
Bank, JP Morgan-Chase, Salomon-CitiBank, etc.).” Id. By participating in market,
“[t]hey provide also added-value services by structuring and distributing portfolios of
credit risk.” Id.
280. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 41.
281. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 3.
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ownership right. 282 In particular, it is able to separate the credit risk
from the other risks of the transaction. When examined from this
perspective, credit derivatives instruments are the opposite of
securitization. In short, when a bond undergoes securitization, the asset
is removed from the balance sheet, but the bank continues to assume the
remaining credit risk. 283 In contrast, credit derivatives instruments retain
the asset while eliminating risk because the risk itself, not the asset, is
sold in the market. 284 CDSs are developing into standardized devices for
transferring credit risk among the various credit derivatives
instruments. 285
E. Protection Buyer and Protection Seller
Credit risk is an inevitable element of the banking business. The
concept of credit risk protection lies at the core of a CDS. Most of the
transactions in the market are conducted by selling or buying
protection. 286 Here, the protection buyer (the party who is actually
selling its risk) transfers credit risk in exchange for payment of a
premium. 287 The protection seller, on the other hand, receives a
premium in return for assuming the counterparty’s credit risk. 288
Accordingly, the payer of a fixed amount in a swap transaction
agreement is the protection buyer, or risk seller, while the payer of a
floating amount is the protection seller, or risk buyer. 289 The protection
buyer pays a fixed cash flow through the CDS and receives the cash
flow contingent upon a credit event. 290 The diagram below illustrates
the parties’ relationship.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 690.
See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 136-37.
See ANSON ET AL., supra note 224, at 105.
See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 687-90.
See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 690.
See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 109. “The only risk faced by the
protection seller is that the protection buyer fails to pay the premium for whatever
reason.” Id.
288. See id.
The protection buyer faces two key risks: 1. The reference entity defaults and the
protection seller is unable to pay the notional amount due to the protection buyer on
delivery of the appropriate obligation. 2. The reference entity does not default but the
protection seller files for bankruptcy thus rendering its protection worthless.

Id.
289.
290.

See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 24-25, 70-71.
See id.
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Relationship of the Parties in the CDS Market 291
Credit Default Swap Swap payment
Market
Protection buyer
Fixed
Protection seller
Floating

Underlying credit position
Short position (selling a bond)
Long Position (buying a bond)

F. Underlying Assets and Reference Assets
Generally, the concepts of underlying assets and reference assets
are interchangeable. Credit derivatives instruments target specific
obligations such as loans or bonds to repay the original obligor. In this
case the credit risk seller usually holds the applicable loan obligation or
bond. 292 There is not necessarily a need for the credit risk seller to hold
the asset, however. If various types of loan obligations or bonds are
held in hand, the credit risk seller could not only engage in a credit
derivatives transaction that covers specific assets individually, but also
could choose comprehensive transactions for credit risk hedging by
targeting bonds that show the original obligor’s credit standing.
Firstly, a “reference entity” is a specific company that has credit
risk, which serves as the underlying asset of the transaction. 293
“Reference obligation” refers to the specific corporate bond issued by
the reference entity, 294 designated by the credit derivatives agreement or
loan of the reference entity. 295 The reference entity can be interpreted as
a reference asset as well, referring to the underlying asset to which one
transfers credit risk. 296 Meanwhile, “reference obligation” refers to a
special obligation such as large scale bond issuance, which is issued or
guaranteed by a reference asset or reference entity. 297 The reference
obligation is effectively linked to the default swap in terms of the
reference entity’s capital structure. 298 Accordingly, if a credit event
291.
292.
293.
294.

§ 2.3.
295.
296.
297.
298.

MERRILL LYNCH, CREDIT DERIVATIVE HANDBOOK 2003, at 10 (2003).
See id.
See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 2.1.
See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 691 n.9; 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16,
See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 289.
See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 681; see also CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 49.
See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 2.3.
See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 65.
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occurs while the reference asset is the senior priority of the unsecured
obligation, then the protection buyer can transfer the obligation or duty
of the same priority as the reference asset. 299
Although it is difficult to clearly distinguish the concepts, the term
“underlying asset” is commonly used when a fixed third asset targeted
by a credit derivatives transaction is specified or when the credit risk
seller holds on to the particular asset. 300 On the other hand, there is a
tendency to use the term “reference asset” more frequently when it is
difficult to specify an original obligation such as the third party’s credit
rating or the credit risk seller’s decision not to retain the asset that is the
target of the transaction. The business world tends to use the two terms
interchangeably without clearly distinguishing them.
G. Fixed Fee Payment and Escaping Credit Risk
Trading strategies in the CDS include fixing fee payments and
escaping credit risk. A CDS mandates that the protection buyer pay a
premium to the protection seller for each fixed term in exchange for
protection from credit events relating to the reference entity.301 Like
other swap transactions, a transaction of the original asset itself does not
take place prior to the occurrence of a credit event. 302 The fixed fee is
generally referred to as a premium and is indicated as “bp,” which is
paid quarterly. 303 This is the manner in which credit risk in the reference
entity is hedged.
The specific premium amount paid by the protection buyer to the
protection seller is set at the beginning of the transaction. 304 Several
factors affect the premium that the protection seller receives. One
influential factor is the maturity of the transaction. 305 When the
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

See id.
See DAS, supra note 33, at 127-28.
See supra Part II.B.
See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 47.
See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 291.
See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 50.
See N.Y. BD. OF TRADE, UNDERSTANDING FUTURES & OPTIONS 22 (2004),
available at http://www.iepstein.com/CD_Brochure/pdfs/nybot12.pdf.

Time and intrinsic value are reflected in the option premium in much the
same way that an insurance premium reflects the calculated risk that the
coverage in the policy will be utilized. The greater the volatility and the
longer the time until expiration, the higher the option premium will be.
Id.
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transaction has matured for a longer period of time, the protection seller
must assume a higher risk that becomes increasingly difficult to
measure. 306 A second factor that increases the premium is the higher
possibility of default. 307 Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s credit rating is
the typical index that shows the possibility of default. 308
The credit rating of a CDS counterparty also influences the
premium. 309 For example, from the point of view of the protection
buyer, who has a credit rating of “A” and is trying to transfer credit risk
to the reference asset, there is no point in signing an agreement with a
counterparty whose credit rating is “BB” because that counterparty has a
high risk of defaulting before it can perform the agreement.
Accordingly, higher premiums must be paid when signing an agreement
with a protection seller who has a high credit rating. 310 In addition, the
premium increases when the correlation between the credit of the
reference asset and the credit of the counterparty is lower. 311 If the
correlation between the two parties is higher, there is a higher possibility
that the counterparty will default if the reference asset is facing
default. 312 When the counterparty faces default, a protection buyer is
unable to hedge the credit risk through a CDS.

306.
307.

See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 688-95.
See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 7, at 1042-43 (listing S&P default rate
assumptions for CDOs).
308. See id. at 1026. “Importantly, the [credit rating] agencies rate bonds within a
particular rating category, say AAA, even though market prices imply different
probabilities of default.” Id. at 1043.
309. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 688-90.
310. See id. at 1043. It is because “the ratings of CDO tranches should be sensitive
to the correlation of the underlying assets.” Id.
311. See J.P. MORGAN, THE J.P. MORGAN GUIDE TO CREDIT DERIVATIVES 41,
available at http://www.investinginbonds.com/assets/files/Intro_to_Credit_Derivatives
.pdf.
Counterparty risk consequently affects the pricing of credit derivative transactions.
Protection bought from higher-rated-counterparties will command a higher premium.
Furthermore, a higher credit quality premium; protection purchased from a
counterparty against a Reference Entity is less valuable if a simultaneous default on
the two names has a higher probability.

Id.
312.

See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 35.
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The “recovery rate” 313 of the reference asset also influences the
premium. The loss incurred by the protection buyer determines the
amount that the protection seller must pay to the protection buyer during
a credit event. 314 The loss is calculated by deducting the value of
recovery from the reference asset’s face value. 315 The premium
decreases as the asset’s recovery rate increases. 316 Realistically,
however, the recovery rate of the reference asset can change drastically
depending on the protection seller’s capacity to manage a
nonperforming loan or bad asset. 317 Likewise, a protection seller with
outstanding management capacity over such an asset can increase the
recovery rate compared to other protection sellers who have a lower
management capacity on that asset. Protection sellers with better
management capacities give incentive to sign a CDS at a lower-thanaverage premium. This is the reason why investment banks with an
outstanding ability to restructure failing companies can actively leverage
a CDS. If default does not occur during the period of swap agreement,
the premium that the protection buyer paid to the protection seller
simply becomes cash flow.
H. Balance Sheet Rent and the Leverage Effect
The party who assumes a credit risk with regard to the TRS
transaction does not need to raise capital to invest in the underlying
asset. Looking back to the example in Part I.C, the party that provided
the capital for Company B is Bank A, the credit risk seller, not Bank C,
the party assuming the credit risk. Bank A signed the loan agreement
with Company B to provide a $1 million loan. According to the loan
313. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 22.
In the bond market, . . . the Recovery Rate of a defaultable obligation [is defined] as
the percentage of par claim of the obligation recovered by investors following default.
Recovery rates depend not only on the actual recovery rate post default but also the
time taken for the recovery rate to be realised. . . . In the CDS market, recovery [rate]
is defined as the market price of the delivered obligation in the default swap contract
following a credit event.

Id. (emphasis omitted).
314. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 7, 15-16.
315. See id.
316. See id. at 16.
317. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 7, at 1042-43 (“Recovery rates . . . for assets vary
depending on the nature of the asset, particularly its seniority.”). Furthermore, “[t]his is
far from an exact science . . . and there rarely is historical evidence of default rates for
particular assets . . . .” Id.
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agreement, Bank A is the lender and the loan obligation for Company B
is left on Bank A’s balance sheet since Bank A retains the status as a
lender in accordance with the loan agreement. This is the case even
when Bank A carries out a TRS transaction with Bank C using said loan
obligation as the underlying asset.
At this time, the LIBOR+30 bp that Bank C paid Bank A is the
same or very similar to the interest that is applied when Bank C lent
money from Bank A. Applying the same or similar interest rate is
logical since this is similar to Bank C borrowing $1 million from Bank A
in order to lend it to Company B. The loan for Company B is then
recorded on Bank A’s balance sheet while Bank C enjoys the same
position as if it had actually lent the money directly to Company B,
ostensibly allowing Bank C to hold Bank A’s balance sheet. 318 Products
that factor in the “leverage effect” 319 by including more than the margin
of value fluctuation of the underlying asset to the terms, however, are
becoming more prevalent.
I. ISDA Swap Documents
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association’s 320 efforts to
standardize swap agreements have been integral in advancing the use of
credit derivatives instruments, particularly in the areas of standardization
of interest and currency swaps. 321 Above all, ISDA contributed greatly
to preventing disputes and reducing transaction costs by standardizing
the swap agreement. 322 Specifically, a general swap transaction is made

318. See ANSON ET AL., supra note 224, at 105-09 (2004) (illustrating the TRS
mechanism as applied in the bank loan market).
319. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
320. See ISDA, http://www.isda.org (last visited Mar. 15, 2008). The International
Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (known commonly as “ISDA”) was
incorporated in 1985 in New York by the banks that participate in swap transactions.
The participating banks needed to discuss the key topics of interest in the industry, and
to help the general public understand swap transactions. They also hoped to establish
transaction practices, and define transaction standards in order to advance the swap
market. Id.
321. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 285-91.
322. See Feder, supra note 21, at 736-41; see also Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 7, at
39.
ISDA currently has a monopoly on credit derivatives documentation, and market
participants must pay fees for documents. ISDA suggests that it has copyrights to
these documents and that it will enforce its intellectual property rights. It should
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based on the ISDA “Master Agreement” 323 and “Credit Derivatives
Definitions.” 324 An agreement for a detailed transaction tends to modify
parts of the matter related to the credit event or restructuring with the
“Supplement,” which includes the “Schedule” and “Confirmation”. 325
The “Confirmation” lays out the transaction conditions such as
swap principal, amount of payment, interest, and payment method. 326
“Supplement” relates to the organization of specific parties, transaction,
cross-default, restructuring, and other default. It also pertains to the
application of a “Master Agreement” clause, as well as assumption of
withholding tax, notification method, and applicable law. 327 These three
documents comprise a single agreement; if there is disagreement
between the parties, the validity follows the order of “Confirmation” that

abandon those positions and practices. ISDA should make all credit derivatives
documentation available for free on the Internet.

Id.
323. See ISDA Master Agreement and Bridge, http://www.isda.org/publications/isda
masteragrmnt.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2008). The ISDA Master Agreement was
drafted in 1992 and has since been superseded by the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement.
324. See 1999 Credit Derivatives Definitions, Supplements and Commentaries,
http://www.isda.org/publications/isdacredit-deri-def-sup-comm.html (last visited Feb.
28, 2008). The ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions are composed with main text and
various supplements:
The 2003 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions (the “2003 Definitions”) are intended
for use in confirmations of individual transactions governed by agreements such as the
2002 ISDA Master Agreement or the 1992 ISDA Master Agreements published by
ISDA. The 2003 Definitions update the 1999 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions
and offer the basic framework for the documentation of privately negotiated credit
derivative transactions. The 2003 Definitions update provisions in the 1999 ISDA
Credit Derivatives Definitions relating to Successor and several Credit Events. In
addition, the 2003 Definitions offer new provisions relating to guarantees, Sovereign
credit default swaps, novation of credit derivative transactions and alternative
procedures in the event the Bond or Loan specified in the Notice of Physical
Settlement is not Delivered.

Id.
325.
326.

See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 286-87.
See id. at 287; see also Donald A. Bendernagel, Richard Ostrander and Brian
D. Rance, Credit Derivatives: Usage, Practice and Issues, 1559 PLI/CORP. 713, 939-55
(2006).
327. See Collins & Sackmann, supra note 19, at 19. Those items have caused
explosive growth of the market and “substantially reduced negotiation time and costs.”
Id.
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regulates special matters: “Supplement,” “Master Agreement,” and
“Credit Derivatives Definitions.” 328
On May 11, 2001, ISDA issued a Restructuring Supplement to the
1999 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions (“Mod-R”). 329 Mod-R
requires that at least three bondholders and two-thirds of the total
number of holders must agree to the readjustment concerning the
restructuring event. 330 Mod-R explains in detail how and when
subordination can be considered a restructuring event. 331 Mod-R also
outlines what can be delivered in order to satisfy the physical settlement
that follows a credit event. 332
Additional matters concerning
restructuring are adopted only with the approval of the parties to the
agreement. 333 The practice in the U.S. derivatives market is based on
Mod-R, 334 but this practice does not appear to be increasing in use in the
European Union. 335
IV. CREDIT EVENTS
Credit derivatives instruments, CDSs in particular, depend on the
cash flow and performance of the agreement between the parties based
on a specific credit risk related event. Thus, the core concern is which
event is defined as a credit risk related event or default event. 336 The
“credit event” becomes the standard for triggering the performance of
the contract terms previously agreed upon by the parties. 337 In general,

328. See MASTER AGREEMENT § 1(b) (Int’l Swap Dealers Ass’n 1992) 1992 ISDA
Master Agreement [hereinafter 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT].
329. See Press Release, ISDA, ISDA Publishes Credit Derivatives Restructuring
Supplement (May 11, 2001), available at http://www.isda.org/press/index.html.
330. See RESTRUCTURING SUPPLEMENT TO THE 1999 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES
DEFINITIONS § 4.10(b) (2001) [hereinafter 2001 RESTRUCTURING SUPPLEMENT].
331. See id. § 2.30(b).
332. See id. § 2.29.
333. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 47.
334. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 70.
335. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 48.
336. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 289-92.
337. Emily R. Pollack, Assessing the Usage and Effect of Credit Derivatives, at 42
(Harvard Law School Int’l Fin. Seminar, Apr. 28, 2003).
What if Restructuring Was Not Included as a Credit Event? . . . When the
Restructuring Credit Event is included, banks that are asked to restructure loans are
put in an enviable position. These banks are given the opportunity to grant an
extension, presumably collect fees for providing this service, and then still have the
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something is recognized as a credit event only when a minimum set of
terms outlined in the agreement has been satisfied. 338 In the past two
decades, however, “[a] variety of new swap[] [techniques] have
appeared to meet the risk management needs of the capital markets.” 339
A credit event refers to the credit risk connected event that becomes
the standard for triggering performance of the agreement for cash or
physical settlement as performance upon the credit derivatives
instrument. 340 A credit event can be defined in a number of ways
depending on the purpose of the transaction, which includes a “failure to
pay” principal or interest, “bankruptcy” of borrower companies, “workout” or “restructuring,” “decrease or increase” of credit rating above or
below a certain level, and so forth. 341 Thus, the procedures used to
determine whether a credit event has occurred and the events that will
actually create an obligation on the part of the counter-party need to be
specified in the agreement in a way that will minimize ambiguity.
In general, assessment of a credit event is verified with information
that can be obtained publicly in order to ensure objectivity. When the
materiality threshold 342 is met and the set of terms outlined in the
agreement has been satisfied, the credit event prerequisite has occurred.
For instance, in the case of a simple performance delay, the market value
of the reference asset has to have decreased 10% relative to the face
value. 343 With the understanding that there may be a dispute about
whether a credit event has occurred or on the timing of the credit event,
it is customary to include a clause in the agreement that the parties agree
occurrence of the Restructuring Credit Event if they have bought protection through a
credit default swap.
....
Yet, if Restructuring was eliminated as a Credit Event, banks would also be put in a
difficult position. If the creditworthiness and financial condition of a Reference
Entity had deteriorated significantly, banks might be placed in the uncomfortable
position of having to force default in orders to obtain protection through the triggering
of a Credit Event such as Bankruptcy or Failure to Pay.

Id.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 49.
See Aicher et al., supra note 81, at 953.
See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 47.
See id.
See infra Part IV.C.
Such a materiality clause was included in the 1998 ISDA document labeled,
“Confirmation of OTC Credit Swap Transaction Single Reference Entity–NonSovereign.” It was “too vague and subjective.” See Pollack, supra note 337, at 8.
However it is very useful in the application of BDS and PDS transactions.
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to abide by the decision of a neutral third party who is knowledgeable of
the market situation.
A. Classifications
In 1999, ISDA drafted the “Definitions” of “Credit Derivatives,”
and specified the situations that are classified as credit events. With this
set of definitions, ISDA concluded that a credit event takes place amidst
at least one of these situations: bankruptcy, 344 obligation acceleration, 345
obligation default, 346 failure to pay, 347 repudiation/moratorium, 348 and
restructuring. 349
Meanwhile, the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement defines default,
which may result in relation to obligation, as one of following eight
events: failure to pay or deliver, 350 breach of agreement, 351 credit support
default, 352 misrepresentation, 353 default under specified transaction, 354
cross default, 355 bankruptcy, 356 and merger without assumption. 357
According to the definitions specified by section 4.7(a) of the 1999
ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions:
Restructuring means that, with respect to one or more Obligation,
including as a result of an Obligation Exchange, and in relation to
aggregate amount of not less than the Default Requirement, any one
or more of the following events occurs, is agreed between the
Reference Entity or a Governmental Authority and the holder or
holders of such Obligation or is announced (or otherwise decreed) by
a Reference Entity or a Governmental Authority in a form that is
binding upon a Reference Entity, and such event is not provided for
under the terms of such Obligation in effect as of the later of the

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.2.
Id. § 4.3.
Id. § 4.4.
Id. § 4.5.
Id. § 4.6.
Id. § 4.7.
1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 328, §5 (a)(i).
Id. §5 (a)(ii).
Id. § 5(a)(iii).
Id. § 5(a)(iv).
Id. § 5(a)(v).
Id. §5 (a)(vi).
Id. § 5(a)(vii).
Id. § 5(a)(viii).
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Trade Date and the date as of which such obligation is issued or
incurred:
(i) a reduction in the rate or amount of interest payable or the
amount of scheduled interest accruals; (ii) a reduction in the
amount of principal or premium payable at maturity or at
scheduled redemption dates; (iii) a postponement or other
deferral of a date or dates for either (A) the payment or accrual
of interest or (B) the payment of principal or premium; (iv) a
change in the ranking and priority of payment of any
Obligation, causing the subordination of such Obligation; or
(v) any change in the currency or composition of any payment
358
of interest or principal.

Restructuring also includes the result of bond/obligation
exchange, 359 which requires that the result is greater than the standards
of minimum “default requirement” in accordance to the “materiality
clause.” 360 The declaration of unredeemed, moratorium or maintenance
of the status quo is included as well. 361
This credit event is often outlined in the agreement between related
parties. When creating a CDS agreement, a detailed rule is laid out by
which a credit event triggers transfer of risk on the business transaction
level.
[I]f an occurrence would otherwise constitute a Credit Event, such
occurrence will constitute a Credit Event whether or not such
occurrence arises directly or indirectly from: (a) any lack or alleged
lack of authority or capacity of a Reference Entity to enter into any
Obligation, (b) any actual or alleged unenforceability, illegality,
impossibility or invalidity with respect to any Obligation, however
described, (c) any applicable law, order, regulation, decree or notice,
however described, or the promulgation of, or any change in, the
interpretation by any court, tribunal, regulatory authority or similar
administrative or judicial body with competent or apparent
jurisdiction of any applicable law, order, regulation, decree or notice,
however described, or (d) the imposition of, or any change in, any
exchange controls, capital restrictions or any other similar

358. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.7(a); see also BOMFIM, supra note
1, at 293.
359. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.9.
360. Id. § 4.8(a).
361. See STEINHERR, supra note 62, at 167.
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restrictions imposed by any monetary or other authority, however
362
described.

Regarding ISDA’s definitions of the credit derivatives instrument,
“certainty and objectivity” are important standards concerning the
definition of the credit event. 363 When interpreting a credit event, the
text should be interpreted narrowly, and any analogical interpretation
following the situation should be limited.
1. Tendency to Downplay the Scope of Credit Events
The scope of a credit event is significantly narrower than the
general scope of the default concept. If the concept of a credit event is
interpreted broadly enough to include simple delay or even minor factual
elements of default for technical reasons, the protection seller would
face the risk that settlement may be triggered before the credit of the
reference entity reaches the critical point. In particular, a significant part
of the risk relating to the CDS transaction results from the moral hazard
of the intermediary financial institutions. 364
The fact that the intermediary financial institutions decide on the
timing of the credit event and the amount of loss incurred gives rise to
frequent conflicts due to the difference of opinion on a specific event
and any contradictory terms that could be inherent in the transaction
agreement. Investors will want to use a broad definition with regard to
the scope of a credit events and default events. 365 A CDS might be

362. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.1.
363. See Collins & Sackmann, supra note 19, at 23.
Under the 1999 Definitions, [a] sovereign [may] conducted [restructuring] while its
credit rating was being downgraded, a Restructuring would occur even though the
sovereign may be financially sound. Hence, sovereign default swaps could be
triggered before there has been a material change in the creditworthiness of the
sovereign. In effect, users of sovereign default swaps may obtain a higher probability
of receiving a payout than standard default swap users. Due to this enhanced risk,
[swap] dealers are reluctant to provide sovereign default swaps that include a
Restructuring credit event until the ambiguity over what constitutes a Restructuring is
resolved.

Id.
364. This is the same for the TRS as well as other credit products. See, e.g.,
TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 10-12.
365. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 224 (“Buyer of credit default protection will
attempt to put as many trigger events as possible in to the credit default protection
language.”).
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different, however, because the agreement ends with the delivery of the
asset.
In a broad interpretation scenario, the protection buyer would not be
compensated for the even more serious future credit event that decreases
the value of the buyer’s reference obligation. 366 Protection under the
CDS agreement is a swap agreement, not an option agreement. 367 Most
of the credit derivatives instruments settlement processes can be
triggered by both the protection buyer and protection seller. 368 As a
result, many efforts were made to simplify the permissible scope of the
credit event. 369
Unlike the U.S., where rescheduling of debt,
acceleration, and default are excluded from the scope of credit events
under swap agreements with non-sovereign debt, the E.U. “market
participants . . . argue that any restructuring, regardless of its purpose,
should be deemed a Credit Event for the [derivatives transaction.]” 370
2. Definition from International Credit Rating Agency
of Failure to Pay
The concept of the credit event used with the credit derivatives
instrument is broader than that of default used by the credit rating
agencies. 371 Credit derivatives instruments are an over-the-counter
transaction between the protection buyer and protection seller.372
Accordingly, the concept of a credit event is one that is outside the
traditional scope of interest for the credit rating agencies, since it is not
typically linked with the capital funding agreement of the primary
market.
Moody’s, the international credit rating agency, identified in its
structured finance special report the difference between the credit event

366.
367.
368.
369.

See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 7, 92-94.
See TAVAKOLI, TRS, supra note 167; see also BOMFIM, supra note 1.
See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 7, 92-94.
Language such as “downgrade,” “currency convertibility,” “governmental
action including war, hostilities, and confiscation,” and “market disruption” are
removed from definitions list. See, e.g., TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 225.
370. See Collins & Sackmann, supra note 19, at 21.
371. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 11.
In the international financial
marketplace, various players are using the credit rating obtained from the U.S.
headquarters of two influential credit rating agencies. Id.
372. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 679.

760

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. XIII

and Moody’s own definition of default. 373 Moody’s definition was
partially adopted by the market, playing a role in narrowing the scope of
the concept of a credit event. According to the report, Moody’s has
rated numerous structured transactions, focusing on the analysis of the
cash settlement market. 374
Interestingly, the cash settlement is used mostly for the evaluation
of synthetic CDOs or CLNs, but is almost never used in the CDS
market. 375 Moody’s report targeted synthetic CDO or CLN investors,
who seek additional risk with which to expose the sellers of
protection. 376 Furthermore, this report viewed the credit derivatives
instrument as a tool for hedging credit risk for both the protection buyer
and the protection seller. 377 Accordingly, some elements that Moody’s
considers additional risk related to a CDS agreement can be viewed as
devices for mitigating risk of the protection buyer. 378
A swap is a clear means to hedge the state of default or mandatory
exchange that decreases the value of an investor’s bond. Moody’s
establishes three means for default:
Any missed delayed disbursement of interest, and/or principal;
bankruptcy or receivership; and Distressed exchange where (i) the
borrower offers debt-holders a new security or package of securities
that amount to diminished financial obligation (such as preferred or
common stock, or debt with a lower coupon or par amount) or (ii)
the exchange that has the apparent purpose of helping the borrower
379
avoid default.

Moody’s factors for setting a credit rating relate not only to the
possibility of defaulting, but also to the recovery value after the default,
as mentioned above. 380 Moody’s evaluates the market value of the
defaulted bond after one month to determine its remaining value.381

373. See JEFFREY S. TOLK, UNDERSTANDING THE RISKS IN CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 5
(2001), available at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/MoodysSyntheticCDORisks.pdf.
374. See TOLK, supra note 373, at 1.
375. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 689 n.10 (introducing British Bankers’
Association’s report).
376. See TOLK, supra note 373, at 2.
377. See id. at 1-2.
378. See id. at 4.
379. See id. at 5.
380. See id.
381. See id.
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This perspective is the result of Moody’s historical studies and its belief
that it is possible to forecast such events. 382
Standard & Poor’s has not expressed an official view on the CDS.
It is clear that S&P gives a better credit rating for the obligation that is
supported by two reference entities, however, which are considered
independent credit risks rather than one entity having implications for
the other. 383 If a reference entity with an A- rating is protected by a
reference entity with an A+ rating, then the credit rating can increase to
AA+. 384
3. Difference between ISDA and Credit Rating Agency
There is a potential difference between a credit event and a default
event on the level of a credit derivatives instrument transaction. This
difference develops when the credit event definition broadens. 385 In
particular, a credit event uses a broader concept than that of default
defined by Moody’s. 386 Moody’s reasoned as follows regarding the
difference between ISDA’s definition on the elements of a credit event
and its own concept of default.
(i) Bankruptcy: There are many similarities between bankruptcy as
defined by ISDA 387 and Moody’s concept of default, 388 but there are
382.
383.

See id.
See STANDARD & POOR’S, CRITERIA: REVISED FRAMEWORK FOR APPLYING
COUNTERPARTY AND SUPPORTING PARTY CRITERIA, at 4 (May 8, 2007), available at
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article/3,1,1,0,1148443971
718.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2007). “For an eligible direct support counterparty to
participate in a ‘AAA’ rated transaction, the minimum rating is a short-term rating of at
least ‘A-1’, or a long-term rating of at least ‘A+’, if it has no short-term rating.” Id.
384. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 9 fig. 1.4. A- is upper-medium grade, while
AA+ is high-grade, high credit quality. Id.
385. See TOLK, supra note 373, at 5-12.
386. According to Moody’s Special Comment, a sovereign issuer is in default when
one or more of the following conditions are met:
1. There is a missed or delayed disbursement of interest and/or principal, even if the
delayed payment is made within the grace period, if any.
2. A distressed exchange occurs, where: (1) The issuer offers bondholders a new
security or package of securities that amount to a diminished financial obligation such
as new debt instruments with lower coupon or par value. (2) The exchange had the
apparent purpose of helping the borrower avoid a “stronger” event of default (such as
a missed interest or principal payment).

PRAVEEN VARMA, SOVEREIGN BOND DEFAULTS, RATING TRANSITIONS,
RECOVERIES (1985-2002) 4 (2003).
387. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.2.
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some differences as well. For example, included among ISDA’s
definition of bankruptcy is when an entity “takes any action in
furtherance of, or indicating its consent to, approval of, or acquiescence
in any of the foregoing acts.” 389 Investors might be exposed to risk
because the definition does not explicitly mention the default, making
this regulation on the credit event vague and difficult to interpret. 390
Moreover, there is no clear explanation of when the insolvency starts.391
Thus, a credit event may occur even without reaching the actual state of
bankruptcy. 392
(ii) Failure to pay or deliver: Failing to pay, as defined by SDA, 393
is also the same as Mody’s definition of default. 394 Both the failure to
pay and the default uphold the materiality condition that states that the
impaired portion of payment should exceed a specific amount.
(iii) Restructuring: Moody’s presumes that only restructuring
following a mandatory exchange triggers default. 395 Moody’s maintains
three conditions that constitute default following a mandatory exchange:
the restructured obligation should result in a “diminished financial
obligation;” restructuring should have been “involuntary for all
investors;” and restructuring should have taken place to avoid the state
of default that they would have faced. 396 Moody’s interpreted ISDA’s
1999 definition of a credit derivatives instrument, however, to allow a
credit event to be triggered even when the debtor voluntarily agrees to
restructuring. 397 In other words, Moody’s definition of restructuring is
“distressed exchange” and is broader than the scope set by ISDA. 398
(iv) Repudiation/Moratorium: Moody’s questioned the need to
include repudiation or moratorium as instances that trigger a credit event
as was defined by ISDA, 399 when the concept of the failure to pay is
already in place. 400
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

See TOLK, supra note 373, at 5.
See id. § 4.2(i) (repealed by the 2003 ISDA Definitions).
See TOLK, supra note 373, at 6.
See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.2.
See TOLK, supra note 373, at 6.
1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.5.
See TOLK, supra note 373, at 6.
See id. at 8.
See id. at 7.
1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.7(a).
See TOLK, supra note 373, at 7-8.
1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.6(a).
See TOLK, supra note 373, at 9.
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(v) Obligation Acceleration: From Moody’s point of view,
obligation acceleration itself would not be a credit event, but rather
would constitute default only when it actually triggered the involuntary
restructuring. 401 Moody’s opposes including obligation acceleration
within the concept of default where a specific obligation structure loses
the benefit of the given period for repayment due to the impairment on a
specific contract clause, and if the duty to pay back occurs for entire
obligations by the debtor. 402
B. Publicly Available Information
In order for an event to become a credit event, the information
needs to be publicly available to the general investor in the
marketplace. 403 The information should be made available so that at
least two “internationally recognized” news providers can confirm its
existence. 404 Administrative measures by governmental agencies, such
as an act of the financial supervisory institution or a court’s binding
decree, will not result in the occurrence of a credit event. 405 Only an
objective announcement to the general public through the news media
constitutes an effective public announcement. Under the parties’
agreement, the source of the information can be specified arbitrarily.
Public announcement by the media, however, is an important standard
for determining at what point a credit event has actually occurred.
C. Materiality
In addition to the requirement that information be made publicly
available, there is one other prerequisite for a credit event—the
condition of materiality. 406 In order for the conditions of the agreement
to be triggered, regardless of whether a public announcement has been
made, the price of the related notes must meet the specific level the

401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

See id. at 10.
See id. at 10-11.
1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 3.2(c).
Id. §§ 3.5(a)(i), 3.8; see also FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 68.
Cf. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 3.5(a)(i) (stating that the
information must be “publicly available” and published or electronically displayed in
“internationally recognized” news sources).
406. See DAS, supra note 33, at 23, 118 (stating that “materiality clauses prevent
spurious triggering of the credit derivatives”).
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parties agreed upon at signing. 407 This is referred to as the “materiality
clause” and it is a condition precedent set to prevent the triggering of a
credit event by mistake.
A general example of the materiality condition is one in which a
reference entity’s default is necessary only if an additional condition is
met that a set amount of money must be lost. 408 It is this additional
condition that serves as the materiality condition. 409 There is a default
condition of materiality set at $10 million in the case of an obligation
acceleration, where there is an early arrival of the period for paying back
due to a breach of duty. 410
D. Notice
Notice should occur at least once, and often occurs three times
before a credit event that triggers actual payment under the CDS.411
Furthermore, some of the features of the notice can have a significant
impact under the contract. One requirement is that when a credit event
occurs before the ending date specified on the contract, there must be a
reasonably detailed statement showing that a credit event has
occurred. 412 At a minimum, notice should be provided no later than

407. See, e.g., id. at 57, 59 (introducing materiality option in the Credit Default
Swap).
408.
CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 7 (“The risk that an issuer of the debt is unable
to meet its financial obligations . . . is known as default.”). Materiality as an optional
condition
allows the parties to require that in addition to the occurrence of a Credit Event there
has been a significant drop in the price of a Reference Obligation (Price Materiality)
or a significant widening of the spread applicable to a Reference Obligation (Spread
Materiality). The materiality concept protects parties . . . against nominal defaults
that inadvertently may have caused a Credit Event.

Daniel P. Cunningham, R. Brent Jones, & Thomas J. Werlen, ISDA Offers Standard
Documents for Credit Swaps, 17 INTL FIN. L. REV. 21, 23 (1998).
409. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 291-92; cf. 2001 RESTRUCTURING SUPPLEMENT,
supra note 330, § 3.11(a) (requiring that the Credit Event Notice set forth an “amount of
1,000,000 units of the currency in which the Floating Rate Payer Calculation Amount is
denominated”).
410. See DAS, supra note 33, at 23.
411. FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 67.
412. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 3.3.
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fourteen days after the scheduled termination date. 413 The notice should
include an objective description of the event that has occurred.414
For approval of the swap transaction, it is essential to establish
which party has the power to give notice of a credit event. 415 In some
instances, only the protection buyer can provide notice. In other
instances, both protection seller and protection buyer can provide notice.
“The Confirmation will also specify who is capable of serving the Credit
Event Notice.” 416 Recently, the trend has been toward allowing either
the protection buyer or protection seller to provide notice. 417 When the
protection seller initiates a triggering agreement, it is then possible to
provide the necessary help for the utilization of a settlement process of
the market participants who have entered into diverse agreements that
involve actual buying and selling of the protection with the reference
asset. 418
In theory, if the definition of credit event is applied broadly, it can
be used as a management strategy whereby protection buyers may
release the bond into the market before its value drastically decreases to
avoid a complete default. This is mostly theoretical and is very rare in
the actual marketplace.
When a credit event occurs, the party who has a duty to provide
notice may only provide notice of the occurrence of a credit event one
time. 419 A protection buyer can then demand settlement for only the
portion of the transaction that relates to that credit event, with the
remaining portion of the credit risk protection terminating at that
point. 420

413. FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 67; see also BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 292 n.6
(“[T]he Credit Event Notice and Notice of Publicly Available Information can [both] be
delivered up to 14 days after the maturity date of the contract.”).
414. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 67.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 3.2(e); see also FRANCIS ET AL.,
supra note 59, at 67.
418. FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 67-68.
419. See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 3.3. While there is not a number
of required notice specified in the ISDA Definitions the definitions provide that “[a]
Credit Event Notice must contain a description in reasonable detail of the facts relevant
to the determination that a Credit Event has occurred.” Id.
420. See 2001 RESTRUCTURING SUPPLEMENT, supra note 330, § 4 (Commentary on
Restructuring Supplement).
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E. Sources
Notice of publicly available information, along with the credit event
notice, is required. 421 This verifies the source of information for the
occurrence of the credit event. If the information is not such that is
recognized by an official record or reference entity, then it is crucial for
the coverage of the credit event to be carried out by the specified
number (usually two) 422 of internationally authorized sources of
information. 423
For clearing purposes, the “event termination date,” “if the [n]otice
of [p]ublicly [a]vailable [i]nformation is applicable, . . . [is the date]
when both the [c]redit [e]vent [n]otice and [n]otice of [p]ublicly
[a]vailable [i]nformation are first effective.” 424 When the agreement
uses the physical settlement method, then notice of physical settlement
must be served within 30 days of the event determination date. 425
This notice should outline the type of obligations that are to be
delivered by the protection buyer to the protection seller. Physical
settlement should occur within thirty business days from the time of
notice of intended physical settlement. 426 In this case, the protection
buyer should transfer the appropriate obligation within five days from
the date when the physical settlement period ends, or assume the risk
that accompanies loss of protection. 427
F. Settlement
Defining the scope of the obligation is critical when deciding
whether a credit event has occurred. 428 In order to decide whether a
credit event has occurred in the reference entity, the applicable scope of
the term is an important determinant. ISDA’s 1999 definition of a credit
derivatives instrument divides the scope of obligation into six

421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.

1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 3.2(c).
Id. § 3.8.
See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 68.
1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 1.8.
FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 68.
Id.
See CREDIT DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS §§ 8.1, 9.2(c)(ii) (Int’l Swaps &
Derivatives Ass’n 2003) [hereinafter 2003 ISDA DEFINITIONS].
428. Cf. BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 289 (“[O]ne of the most important definitions in a
credit default swap contract is that of ‘default.’”).
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categories. 429
The most frequently used obligation category is
“borrowed money,” 430 which means payment is made from the borrowed
money. The protection buyer discontinues periodic premium payments
as defined by the agreement once a credit event occurs. 431 The mere fact
that the credit event occurred, however, does not mean that it is
impossible to claim the right of the reference entity.
When a credit event occurs, the protection seller must pay the
protection buyer the amount agreed upon. 432 Ordinarily, this type of
payment takes the form of an exchange of the actual asset between the
buyer and seller. The protection buyer provides a trustworthy certificate
of obligation for the reference entity, which is referred to as the
“deliverable obligation,” 433 and receives, in return, a cash settlement that
is equal to the face value of the total asset. 434
As a result of mergers and acquisitions or corporate restructuring,
the rights and liabilities of the reference entity can actually be succeeded
by the new entity. 435 The CDS agreement is structured with a financial
technique that allows a bondholder’s experience to be effectively
reflected with the obligation of the reference entity in the cash market.
In general, a minimum specific amount of distributed shares are paid to
the creditor even when the company is liquidated. After the declaration
of a credit event, a bond’s market value decreases significantly
compared to its face value. A protection buyer who signed the CDS
agreement benefits from the protection, however, despite the decrease in
market value.

429.
430.

FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 64.
BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 289; see FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 64. “Other
more narrow Obligation Categories are Borrowed Money, Bond, Loan, Bond or Loan,
Reference Obligations Only.” Id.
431. WHALEY, supra note 4, at 689.
432. See id. at 686, 688.
433. See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 2.15 (defining deliverable
obligation). In the CDS agreement pertaining to the physical settlement method, the
protection buyer is guaranteed to be paid the total face value in cash in exchange for the
right to transfer the proper obligation of the reference asset to the protection seller.
Because the reference asset is being issued in various bonds or obligations under the
declaration and with different market values on default, accurate information pertaining
to deliverable obligations is critical for the calculation of the protection seller’s risk.
434. See Chan-Lau, supra note 151, at 5.
435. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 288.
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Physical settlement is used more frequently than cash settlement in
the CDS transaction. 436 In the case of physical settlement, valuation is
not required since the protection buyer simply transfers the total face
value duty for the reference asset to the protection seller. Currently,
however, cash settlement methods are becoming more widespread in
other types of deals such as Synthetic CDO transactions. In these
transactions, a one time cash payment is required as the terms pertaining
to the decrease in market value assumed by the specific obligation of the
reference asset are considered in advance. 437
The cash settlement method is different from the physical
settlement method in the sense that it requires actual cash payment to the
protection seller when a credit event occurs, entitling the protection
buyer to “the difference between the par and market values of the
reference obligation.” 438 Because physical settlement involves returning
the original bond certificate to the protection seller, it prevents the
protection buyer from closing the applicable transaction at the market
price when the credit event occurred. 439
V. APPLICATION
The most important legal issue regarding the CDS is, perhaps, the
occurrence of a credit event that induces actual transfer of risk between
the parties to an agreement. 440 Argentina’s sovereign debt restructuring
epitomizes a hotly debated credit event that is often cited in CDS
436. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 689 n.10 (noting that the British Bankers’
Association in 2004 reported that 86% of credit derivates contracts had physical
settlement).
437. WHALEY, supra note 4, at 688.
438. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 292.
439. Cf. Angus Duncan, Loan-only Credit Default Swaps: The March to Liquidity,
COM. LENDING REV. (2006), at 21 (stating that delivery of the “reference obligation is
exchanged for its par value”). In order to “avoid the difficulty of arriving at fair and
timely outcomes from the perspective of both sellers and buyers of protection” a
relatively new settlement mechanism,” also known as “pay-as-you-go for CDS of ABS
(“PAYG”),” “has been developed in the U.S.” Id. at 20-21. Under this mechanism, the
protection seller paid to protection buyer “floating payments” meaning that “principal
or interest shortfall or principal write-down amounts on the reference obligation on a
current basis.” Id. at 21.
440. Cf. Brief of Appellee at *1, Eternity Global Master Fund, Ltd. v. Morgan Guar.
Trust Co., 2003 WL 24072300 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 03-7652) [hereinafter Appellee
Brief] (putting forth before the Court of Appeals the question of whether a credit event
had occurred under the swaps).
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litigation. 441 The purpose of restructuring as a credit event is to assist in
the declaration of default by the creditor and debtor, and to mitigate the
negative atmosphere that surrounds the attempt of parties to change the
terms of their loan agreement.
On December 24, 2001, Argentina’s interim President, Adolfo
Rodriguez Saa, signed a moratorium decreeing the suspension of all
external debt. 442 This declaration was significant because of the legal
dispute that ensued between the financial institutions over whether the
restructuring up until the announcement of the moratorium constituted a
credit event according to the CDS agreement. 443
A. Eternity Global Master Fund
Eternity Global Master Fund (“EGMF”), managed and operated by
HWF Capital, 444 signed three credit swap agreements with the Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company of New York and JP Morgan Chase Bank (“JP
Morgan”). 445 The two parties signed a $14 million credit swap
agreement, transferable at specific intervals with various maturity
dates. 446 While they were executed on different dates with different
lengths of maturity, the three agreements comprising the swap were

441. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 64; see also Collins & Sackmann, supra
note 19, at 20 (introducing Xerox case).
442. See Carina Lopez, The Argentina Crisis: A Chronology of Events After The
Sovereign Default, STANDARD & POOR’S, Apr. 12, 2002, at *2.
443. Cf. J.F. Hornbeck, Argentina’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring 4 (CRS Report
for Congress) Order Code RL32637 (Oct. 19, 2004) (citation omitted) (discussing the
general framework for recovering defaulted sovereign debt). With regard to such
measures:
When a country becomes insolvent and defaults on its debt, a general framework for
analyzing its options points to three critical responses. First, the country must adjust
policies. This includes correcting fiscal and current account deficits, as well as
structural imbalances, which in Argentina’s case involve the banking sector, utility
regulation, and federal-provincial fiscal relations. Second, [so called] emergency IMF
financing is needed. Third, debt must be restructured to achieve longer-term financial
sustainability.

Id.
444. Complaint ¶ 7, Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co.,
2002 WL 32150389 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02-CV-1312) [hereinafter EGMF
Complaint].
445. Id. ¶ 21.
446. Id.
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essentially the same transaction. 447 In the credit swap agreement, EGMF
purchased emerging market 448 bonds from JP Morgan, and specifically
set out that a default of Argentina would constitute a credit event. 449 At
the time of the agreement, JP Morgan was an advisor to Argentina’s
Ministry of Finance, and was the largest underwriter of Argentina’s
dollar-denominated sovereign debt. 450
In the above mentioned
agreement, EGMF was the risk buyer (protection seller) and JP Morgan
was the risk seller (protection buyer). Their credit swap agreement
incorporated the 1999 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions and the 1992
ISDA Master Agreements. 451 These two documents outlined the terms
of payment and defined specific terms such as settlement, portfolio, and
credit event. 452
Under the definitions adopted in the agreement, settlement referred
to “physical settlement,” while portfolio meant “deliverable
obligation.” 453 The physical settlement amount was set as the “floating
rate payer calculation amount,” 454 which is a multiplication of the
reference price. 455 The agreement required that the parties provide
reasonable detail regarding notice of the credit event. 456 The target
credit events were divided into four categories: (i) “failure to pay,” (ii)
“obligation acceleration,” (iii) “repudiation/moratorium,” and (iv)
“restructuring.” 457 The two parties specified that The Wall Street
Journal, the New York Times, The Financial Times, Reuters,
Bloomberg, and the Dow Jones News Wires would qualify as sources of
information for publicizing the credit event. 458

447. See id. (stating the parties entered into the three agreements within a seven-day
period and that the terms of the agreements were essentially the same).
448. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 172. “Emerging markets is the term usually
reserved for developing economies.” Id. “The emerging markets are often classified as
Latin America including Mexico, Eastern Europe, and most Asian countries.” Id.
449. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 30.
450. Id. ¶ 13.
451. Id. ¶ 22.
452. Id. ¶¶ 24, 27, 30.
453. Id. ¶¶ 24, 27.
454. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 2.13 (defining the term “floating rate
payer calculation amount”).
455. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 25.
456. Id. ¶ 28.
457. Id. ¶ 30.
458. Id. ¶ 28.
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When Argentina’s economy collapsed, EGMF notified JP Morgan
on three occasions that the reference entity of the credit swap agreement,
the Republic of Argentina’s debt restructuring, constituted a credit
event. 459 JP Morgan refused the payment, however, claiming that the
credit event had not occurred. 460 EGMF subsequently initiated litigation
as JP Morgan refused payment on the $3 million credit swap
agreement. 461
B. Daehan Investment Trust Management
Daehan Investment Trust Management (“DITM”) signed a CDS
agreement in 1996 for an emerging market basket note that entailed
paying 10.2% of the original capital of $96 million every year as a
premium to JP Morgan Chase Bank. 462 From an economic standpoint,
DITM and JP Morgan were the parties to the agreement, but DITM used
an off-shore Daehan Global Bond 2 Fund (“DGB2”) and JP Morgan
used a paper company, Perana, for regulatory, legal, and financial
purposes. 463 In the CDS agreement, DITM assumed the role of
protection seller while JP Morgan assumed the role of protection buyer.
The emerging market basket note was the CLN, 464 which granted the
right to DITM to receive interest incurred every year and principal on
the maturity date, based on credits from Latin American nations such as
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. 465 The agreement included a clause,
however, whereby JP Morgan would not pay the principal or interest for
the applicable part of the note if a credit event occurred in the related
nations. 466 If default had not occurred, the residual could have been one
of the credit derivatives instruments under the CDS that would have
been included in the maturity. 467
On December 24, 2001, after the maturity date of the note,
Argentina issued its debt moratorium. 468 This declaration by Argentina

459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.

Id. ¶¶ 38, 40.
Id. ¶ 39.
Id. ¶¶ 63, 65.
See supra Part II.E; see also DITM Complaint, supra note 98, ¶ 9.
DITM Complaint, supra note 98, ¶¶ 4, 11.
See discussion supra Part II.D.
See DITM Complaint, supra note 98, ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 27.
Id. ¶ 34.
EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 57.
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constituted a credit event. A problem emerged, however, when the
Argentine government requested that domestic investors initiate a
second swap, in which a $60 billion bond with an average interest rate of
11 to 12 % would change to a 7% interest rate. 469 Ostensibly, this was a
voluntary restructuring since the investors in Argentina were not
required to accept the new swap transaction.
JP Morgan Chase Bank provided notification on December 7, 2001
that it would not pay back the remaining interest and principal of $96
million on the DGB2 fund because of the Argentine default. 470 DITM
objected to this, and brought suit in federal district court in New York in
February 2002 for the payment of the $96 million principal and punitive
damages of $100 million. 471 The purpose of the suit was to request a
declaratory remedy for the alleged wrongful acts of JP Morgan 472 and
for breach of contract with regard to the $96 million credit derivative
instrument transaction 473 that was signed in 1996.
1. Background
The swap agreements that EGMF and DITM each signed with JP
Morgan were specific about the Argentine economic situation as it
pertained to credit events. Although different parties signed the
agreements at different times, the relevant credit event remained the
same. The following addresses how the same credit event applies to
these two cases, and how they were interpreted by the court.
It is important to analyze the sovereign debt restructuring and
development of Argentina’s crisis. In 1992, the Argentine government
adopted a monetary policy that pegged the peso to the United States
dollar. 474 As such, it induced almost revolutionary change in terms of
economic policy and the financial market structure. 475 “Thereafter, the
469. See Hornbeck, supra note 443, at 37. (“International bond rating agencies
consider[ed] it an effective default.”). The first debt swap was conducted on June 1617, 2001. “The de la Rua government announces a $29.5 billion voluntary debt
restructuring in which short-term debt is exchange[d] for new debt with longer
maturities and higher interest rates.” Id. at 3.
470. See DITM Complaint, supra note 98, ¶ 35.
471. See id. ¶ 71.
472. See id. ¶¶ 67-70.
473. See id. ¶¶ 46-55.
474. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 14.
475. See Pham Anh et al., Argentina’s Sovereign Debts Restructuring and Creative
Solutions 342 (on file with Princeton University).
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international demand for Argentine investments increased dramatically
to accommodate the Republic’s ambitious plans for economic
development.” 476 The same situation occurred in Ecuador in 1999,
Russia in 1998, and Mexico in 1995. 477 In 2001, Argentina became a
“hot market” among sovereign debt investors wanting to reap the
benefits of the economic situation. 478 Several funds began aggressively
investing in Argentina’s short-term sovereign debt while hedging via
CDS transactions based on default risk. 479 Contrary to Argentine hopes,
the economy headed into a state of regression beginning in 1998. This
regression led to a cycle of decreases in tax revenue, peso prices edging
downward, and drastic decreases in foreign currency reserves that
followed a fixed FOREX exchange rate system.
In the end, Argentina declared the need to restructure the $95
billion in sovereign debt issued in late 2001 at high interest rates for
relatively short maturity periods. 480 During October and November of
2001, numerous economic news sources and periodicals publicized
Argentina’s proposed plans to re-adjust their debt. 481 On November 1,
2001, Fernando De la Rua, the President of Argentina, asked the
creditors to extend the maturity period on the $95 billion in debt
accompanied by lower interest rates. 482 On November 6, 2001, the

476. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 14.
477. Id. ¶ 16.
478. Id.
479. Id. ¶ 18.
480. Id. ¶ 34.
Sovereign debt restructurings differ from corporate debt restructurings for a host
reasons, most of which do not stem from the absence of an international sovereign
bankruptcy regime. No firm issues its own currency, or indirectly backstops the
banking system. Sovereign debt is, typically a far more important asset in a country’s
financial system than the debt of even a very large local firm, so a sovereign default is
bound to be more disruptive than the default of a firm. The magnitude of the set of
problems that can be solved by introducing a completely new legal regime for
sovereign debt restructuring is too small to justify imposing such a regime on
reluctant creditors and debtors, with unknowable consequences.

Nouriel Roubini & Brad Setser, The Reform of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Process: Problems, Proposed Solutions and the Argentine Episode, 1 J.
RESTRUCTURING FIN. 10-11 (2004) (citation omitted).
481. Jonathan Fuerbringer, International Business: Analysts Worry of Ripple Effect
in Argentina’s Latest Debt Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2001, at C1; see also Kevin G.
Hall, Argentina Seeks to Restructure All Its Debt: Nation Braces For Fallout of Asking
For Lower Rate, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 29, 2001, at A2.
482. EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 33.
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Argentine government announced the final restructuring plan. 483
According to this plan, residents of Argentina who owned an Argentine
bond certificate were entitled to new bonds that paid 15% interest in
exchange for longer-term securities that paid less than 7% of the
maximum interest imposed. 484 In the short run, “Argentina [had
partially] succeeded in swapping its debt, its weight in the EMBI Global
[Index had increased] from 1.9% to 2.7%.” 485 According to the
restructuring plan, the maturity date on these bonds extended three
years, each en bloc. 486
Argentina declared officially on November 19, 2001 that it intended
to execute a voluntary debt exchange for domestic pension funds and for
sovereign debt holders. 487 This was a measure to extend the maturity of
Argentina’s sovereign debt owned by domestic bondholders, as well as
an attempt to lower the coupon rate. 488 On December 1, 2001, a
minimum of $40 billion of Argentine bonds held by domestic investors
was repaid to the government as a guaranteed bond with a significantly
longer maturity date and lower interest rate. 489 Tax benefits were
included as part of the restructuring plan.
Argentina insisted that this type of debt restructuring would be
voluntary rather than forced, and thus would not constitute a default. 490
Payment on Argentina’s public debt was suspended following Rodriguez
Saa’s December 24, 2001 announcement. 491 The financial markets
agreed that this type of measure by the president was sufficient enough
to trigger a credit event. On December 7, 2001, JP Morgan notified
Perana and DITM that default had occurred in Argentina. 492
483.
484.

See Hornbeck, supra note 443, at 4.
See Argentina Announces Debt “Default” Plan, BBC NEWS, Nov. 2, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1633369.stm.
485. Ray Hervandi, Argentina’s Debt Restructuring: The Dark Side of the Credit
Market Revealed?, CROWDOUT, Mar. 14, 2005, http://longrun.typepad.com/crowdout/
(last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
486. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 42.
487. See id. ¶ 36.
488. See id. ¶ 34. “Sovereign debt workouts typically involve issuing new debt for
old, under more lenient conditions that allow a country to eventually recover its
financial standing in the international community.” See Hornbeck, supra note 443, at 6.
489. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 42.
490. See Timeline: Argentina’s Financial Crisis, FOXNEWS.COM, Dec. 6, 2001,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,40274,00.html.
491. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 57.
492. DITM Complaint, supra note 98, ¶ 29.
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Specifically, JP Morgan informed the companies that an event occurred
on December 5, 2001 that was presumed to be a default based on
Argentina’s reference portfolio. 493
JP Morgan argued that, back in 1996, the term “restructuring” was
used in a broader way when the transaction of credit derivatives
instrument agreement was signed between the DGB2 fund and
Perana. 494 JP Morgan asserted that although the Argentine government
averred the voluntary nature of the restructuring, it was essentially
mandatory. 495 JP Morgan further claimed that notice of the credit event
was publicly available on the basis of five news articles from the
Bloomberg terminal. 496 According to these allegations, the Argentine
currency crisis should have been considered a credit event.
Restructuring should be agreed upon by the reference entity,
government authority, or the holders of the obligation, or, in the
alternative, should be declared by a governmental authority in a
mandatory form that binds the reference entity. The 1999 ISDA
definitions of a credit derivatives instrument do not include restructuring
by the reference entity as a credit event if such restructuring is
voluntary. 497 Moreover, the definitions specify that only events that are
involuntary or mandatory may constitute credit events. 498 The 1999
ISDA definitions, however, did not have a direct influence on the
agreement that was signed by DPIM and JP Morgan. At the time,
Moody’s and other international credit rating agencies recognized that
Argentina’s declaration of sovereign debt restructuring was technically a
declaration of default. 499
The 2001 terrorist attacks that worsened a recession in the United
States served to exacerbate Argentina’s long-term economic

493.
494.

Id.
See id. ¶¶ 9, 11 (detailing the terms of the 1996 agreement between JP Morgan
and Daehan).
495. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 37.
496. See DITM Complaint, supra note 98, ¶ 29.
497. Cf. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.9 (“‘Obligation Exchange’
means the mandatory transfer . . . of any securities, obligations, or assets to holders of
Obligations in exchange for such Obligations. When so transferred, such securities,
obligations or assets will be deemed to be obligations.”).
498. See, e.g., 2003 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 427, § 4.9 (defining an
“obligation exchange” as a “mandatory transfer of any securities, obligations or assets
to holders of Obligations in exchange for such Obligations”).
499. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 44.
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stagnation. 500 The Argentine sovereign bond began to be transacted at
below 40% of the U.S. dollar. On October 30, 2001, S&P downgraded
Argentina’s long-term sovereign credit rating from CCC+ to CC, 501 junk
bond status 502 —the same rating Ecuador received when it declared
default in 1999. 503 On October 12, 2001, S&P’s competitor, Moody’s,
also lowered Argentina’s credit rating to Caa3. 504 According to a survey
conducted by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. targeting emerging
market portfolio managers, 85% believed that Argentina’s declaration of
default was inevitable. 505 There was, however, an argument among the
international credit rating agencies over whether a voluntary
restructuring would lead to a default. 506
Credit rating agencies generally set ratings for a bond once the
terms of the agreement are satisfied. Even though it is not clear that
Argentina actually defaulted, it is clear that these terms do not apply in
financial crises. Accordingly, a logical conclusion is that Argentina was
in a generalized state of default. This analysis is based on the argument
that the value of the new bond that is issued in exchange should be
considered a default because even when the nominal value was greater
than the current market value, the bond was impaired through
government measures without proper compensation. 507
Moody’s perspective varied little. The argument about the timing
of the default was merely an academic question. Argentina’s Caa3
rating had many characteristics of default even when it was technically
not in a state of default, because investors knew the ramifications of a

500. See Jonathan Fuerbringer, Argentina May Restructure Its Debt, Risking
Default, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2001, at C4.
501. See Bruno Boccara et al., Argentina Long-Term Sovereign Credit Rating
Lowered to CC; Outlook Negative, STANDARD & POOR’S, Oct. 30, 2001,
http://www.mecon.gov.ar/download/financiamiento/sp10-30-01i.pdf.
502. See generally Marie Cavanaugh, Sovereign Credit Characteristics by Rating
&
POOR’S,
Nov.
19,
2003,
Category,
STANDARD
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/sovereigncreditcharacteristics.
pdf (noting that in bonds below the ‘B’ category there is a “clear and present danger of
default”).
503. See VARMA, supra note 386, at 20 app. III.
504. See id. at 14 app. I.
505. Joshua Goodman, Now, Argentina’s Default Looks Inevitable, BUSINESSWEEK,
Oct. 29, 2001, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_44/b37
55149.htm.
506. See Fuerbringer, supra note 500.
507. See id. (reporting S&P’s statements on Oct. 16, 2007).
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Caa3 rating. Thus it can be concluded that Argentina’s Caa3 rating
should not be considered a default, since it was a voluntary restructuring
obligation, even though the obligation exchange was seemingly driven
by the government and creditors were damaged from the plan.
2. Interpretation of Restructuring
There are two basic approaches to interpretation of a restructuring
that constitutes a credit event: the passive interpretation and the active
interpretation. There is also a modified approach that should be
examined.
(i) Passive Approach
The rationale for the passive approach is that definitions of
agreements should not be ambiguous and should be explicit as they
pertain to the terms of restructuring. 508 Using the passive approach
means that the interpretation of the voluntary restructuring is a legal
issue to be decided by the courts with one literal meaning that accepts
the contract objectively as it is defined. 509 Because the Argentine
government declared voluntary debt exchange, 510 it might be mandatory
in the economic sense, but legally it should be accepted as a voluntary
obligation exchange in accordance with the wording of the agreement.
This view holds that the court should not reinterpret the agreement
among the two parties. 511
“Traditionally, a heavily indebted country could either renegotiate
with its creditors or unilaterally reschedule its debt simply by
announcing the new terms.” 512 During early December 2001, investors
demanded that Argentina repay its $40 billion obligation; the
government accepted all requests for repayment, eventually carrying out
508.
509.

This approach applied to defendant JP Morgan’s position.
Cf. Krumme v. Westpoint Stevens, Inc., 238 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Seiden Assoc. v. ANC Holdings, 959 F.2d 425, 428 (2d Cir.1992)) (discussing
the principles of contract interpretation).
510. EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 37.
511. See Grumman Allied Indus, v. Rohr Indus. Inc., 748 F.2d 729, 734 (2d Cir.
1984) (holding that the court should not intervene in the contractual relationship of the
two parties if the parties clearly laid out the risk in the agreement).
512. See Farisa Zarin, Sovereign Debt: What Happens if a Sovereign Defaults?,
MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE, at 5 (July 2000) available at http://www.moodys.com/cus
t/specialreport/SearchReportFSC.aspx?type=SOV [hereinafter Zarin, Sovereign Debt].
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a debt swap. 513 Contrary to the way news agencies and credit rating
agencies analyzed it, 514 in the passive approach, Argentina’s debt swap
was considered voluntary and did not constitute default. Specifically,
the declaration of default is not actually default since the government
afforded added value by transferring tax revenues to the issued bond that
compensated for the loss in interest.
On November 19, 2001, the Argentine government requested the
voluntary obligation exchange of pension fund and domestic
bondholders, and allowed qualified bondholders to choose whether to
demand that the government repay under the specific obligation
terms. 515 Argentina had unlimited discretion with regard to accepting or
rejecting the demand for repayment. Accordingly, obligation exchanges
would have resulted only if the qualified bondholders demanded
repayment and Argentina chose to accept the demand for repayment of
the obligation. This constituted voluntary restructuring since the
obligation that was repaid was in a trust and the new bond would have
been issued to the bondholder, regardless of who would have then made
the demand for repayment. 516

513.
514.
515.
516.

See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 36.
Id. ¶ 37.
Id. ¶ 36.
See HARALD FINGER ET AL., INT’L MONETARY FUND, CROSS-COUNTRY
EXPERIENCE WITH RESTRUCTURING OF SOVEREIGN DEBT AND RESTORING DEBT
SUSTAINABILITY 10, tbl. 3 (2006) (discussing that the restructuring was a debt for equity
swap called a megaswap).
Prior to the default in late 2001, two rounds of debt treatment were undertaken: [one
is] a debt swap (megaswap) involving debt equivalent to 11% of GDP, followed by a
restructuring of debt held mainly by domestic investors . . ., covering debt equivalent
to 19% of GDP. The November/December 2001 [the above] restructuring, completed
under the imminent threat of default, did not involve any reduction in principal, but
yielded a 32% [Net Present Value] reduction on restructured principal. Given that the
Phase I operation covered a larger portion of debt ($51 billion) than the megaswap
($29.5 billion), together the two debt exchanges resulted in a net NPV reduction of
approximately 10%.

Id. at 15 tbl. 7 (formatting altered).
During Phase I in December 2001, approximately $41 billion in sovereign debt and $9
billion in provincial debt was exchanged into new government-guaranteed loans
featuring a reduction of interest rates to 70% of the contractual level (up to a
maximum of 7%), a 17–month grace period for interest payments, and a three-year
extension of maturities for those original claims maturing up to 2010. The exchange
involved no reduction in principal.

Id. at 48 annex II (formatting altered).
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A scenario in which a debtor pursues restructuring through an
obligation exchange is laid out in the 1999 ISDA restructuring credit
event definition, 517 and is clearly limited to mandatory exchanges.518
Here, the fact that an agreement is not ambiguous means that the
interpretation is a legal issue, and that the court should interpret it using
its literal meaning.
As a matter of law, the obligation exchange may satisfy the
definition of restructuring only when a voluntary exchange is considered
mandatory. 519 Arguing whether an obligation exchange was actually
voluntary, however, runs the risk of letting the courts decide the issue.
This compels the tribunals to forecast whether interested parties will
choose to participate in an obligation exchange, and to perform an
economic analysis of the obligation exchange. The passive approach
stands for the belief that the explicit agreement will dictate whether a
restructuring should be classified as mandatory or voluntary.
If a party wanted to argue that a court’s decision should have been
made based on questions about whether the obligation exchange is
economically coercive or whether there is a practical alternative to debt
swap, they would say that those questions should have been specified in
advance by the agreement. If the parties had intended to include clauses
about what is a voluntary exchange and how such exchanges should be
applied, they should do so in the agreement regardless of whether they
were economically favorable to the creditor. For example, it could be
argued that the following should be included in the definition of an
obligation exchange: “If there is a request for repayment of the bond for
at least a certain amount with regard to the voluntary exchange, this is
considered mandatory, and thus is within the scope of the obligation
exchange.” In order to be sufficiently forceful, a clearly codified
exception clause to a voluntary obligation exchange should have been
included for repayment of the voluntary obligation exchange due to
economic coercion.
Ostensibly, all obligation exchanges can appear mandatory.
Moreover, all bondholders who are involved with the exchange of bonds
tend to disclaim a valuable right in order to obtain a greater chance of
recovery, even though there are lower profits because of the reference

517.
518.
519.

See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, §§ 4.7(a), 4.9.
Id. § 4.9.
Id.
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entity’s collapse. In that case, some degree of economic pressure is
inevitable. 520
Even though “[h]istorically, investors in sovereign debt have been
in a weak position because they were compelled to accept any new
terms,” 521 when there are no incentives, no bondholder would accept a
lower interest rate or any of the prerequisites that are essential for the
application under the 1999 ISDA definitions. Accordingly, it is
unnecessary to find a limiting meaning of the term “mandatory” that is
used in section 4.9 of the ISDA definitions. 522 During litigation, when a
court tries to interpret this agreement, it should not let the agreed terms
become worthless. If the agreement between parties is re-interpreted by
the court, the agreement itself could become unclear, further introducing
uncertainty into the market. Courts should dismiss the crafty intentions
of the parties that are trying to have their contracts interpreted according
to default definitions.
The economic coercion test for restructuring does not apply to the
risk seller and risk buyer who enter into a credit derivatives instrument
transaction. Specific clauses of the obligation exchange that were
suggested by the Argentine government do not provide sufficient
information that would allow for a determination of whether the
suggestion was made to protect the buyer or coerce the protection seller.
In fact, the question of whether economic coercion existed can be
520. See Farisa Zarin, Sovereign Restructurings: Putting Too Much Faith in Exit
Consents, MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE, at 4 (2001) (citation omitted),
http://www.moodys.com/cust/specialreport/SearchReportFSC.aspx?type=SOV
(indicating that it is “both time-consuming and costly to argue with a sovereign). Zarin
states:
If inevitable restructuring becomes hard reality, the sovereign begins the process by
offering to exchange its old bonds for new debt which, generally speaking, have less
favourable financial terms for the creditors. Bondholders are “invited” to tender their
existing bonds in exchange for new debt instruments. Once the offer is accepted, the
old bonds tendered and exchanged for new, the creditor in effect surrenders all of its
rights under the original terms. The duties and responsibilities of the sovereign
toward the creditor, going forward, are those articulated in the new structure. . . .
[T]he majority of bondholders are likely to participate in rescheduling. . . . But a few
creditors will continue to hold the old bonds. In most instances the holdouts are likely
to be “sleepers”—creditors who inadvertently miss the exchange boat. In other more
dubious cases, bondholders may deliberately refrain from tendering. They instead can
demand—and possibly extract—preferential payoffs after the close of the offer
through legal threats.

Id.
521.
522.

Zarin, Sovereign Debt, supra note 512, at 6.
1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.9.
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decided only by examining each specific bondholder, and individual
situations must be factored in sufficiently. Even when the demand for
an obligation exchange could have been coerced regarding a bondholder,
when one considers tax burdens and/or accounting standards, it might
not have been coercive on other parties. Thus, an unclear standard that
is classified as economic coercion cannot become the standard under any
circumstances, and applying subjective criteria under the pretext of
objective criteria should not be tolerated.
If a decision is made about how much economic pressure is
sufficient to effectively transform a voluntary obligation exchange into a
mandatory one, the conclusion will likely be different depending on who
makes the decision. Like EGMF and DITM, market participants who
entered CDS agreements with the counterparty at the same time have
come to rely upon contradictory decisions. These types of conclusions
may bring about more litigation and hotly contested disputes. In fact,
this might induce the exact scenario that the 1999 ISDA definitions
hoped to prevent—lack of a clear idea of restructuring as it pertains to
credit events.
Unlike the transaction with the DITM, JP Morgan argued 523 that
although the Argentine government-conducted voluntary obligation
exchanges, a credit event through restructuring did not take place. 524 JP
Morgan argued that the definition is limited to a mandatory obligation
exchange as long as the restructuring, according to the 1999 ISDA
documents, is enumerated as a form of credit event. 525
Defendant JP Morgan contended that the obligation exchange in
terms of definition can result only when this type of voluntary exchange
is considered mandatory, 526 and further argued that the plaintiff should
not demand that the voluntary obligation exchange be redefined as
mandatory by the courts since the actions taken by Argentina are clearly
voluntary. 527
EGMF then argued that despite the fact that the restructuring credit
event defined in sections 4.7(a)(i), (iii), and (iv) of the 1999 ISDA
definitions happened before December 17, 2001—the maturity date—JP

523. See generally Appellee Brief, supra note 440 (detailing JP Morgan’s arguments
before the Second Circuit).
524. See id. at *8.
525. See id.
526. See id. at *15-16, *20-21.
527. See id.
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Morgan did not make the payment that was required under the CDS
agreement. 528
(ii) Active Approach
The rationale of the active interpretation is that the obligation
exchange requires swapping the obligations of the bondholders, whether
they choose to or not, and regardless of whether the obligation exchange
is controlled by the agreement. The transfer of the instrument to the
bondholders is achieved by order of the reference entity or government
authority. In short, this approach takes the view that these obligation
exchanges forcibly transform the bond certificates into new notes. 529
According to the 1999 ISDA definitions, restructuring includes
unfavorable treatment such as interest or principal reduction, delay in
payment, change of the currency for payment, and change of priority of
obligation repayment during the liquidation or dissolution procedure.530
These events, caused by aggravation of the reference entity’s payment
capacity or financial condition, should not be included when this type of
event does not take place. In other words, despite the fact that a
reference entity actually undergoes a mandatory obligation exchange,
which is disguised as voluntary, it may qualify as a mandatory
obligation exchange and be included as a credit event. This becomes
even clearer in light of the 2001 restructuring supplement to the 1999
ISDA definitions. 531 According to the supplement, a credit event is said
to occur after a restructuring event if at least three holders and two-thirds
of all holders have agreed to the restructuring. 532

528. See Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at *20, Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd.
v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 2003 WL 24072301 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 03-7652)
[hereinafter Appellant Brief].
529. See generally Appellant Brief, supra note 528 (setting forth plaintiff, EMGF’s
position in the litigation).
530. See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.7(a).
531. See 2001 RESTRUCTURING SUPPLEMENT, supra note 330.
532. See id. § 4.10(b). This section provides that:
‘Multiple Holder Obligation’ means an Obligation that (i) at the time the Credit Event
Notice is delivered, is held by more than three unaffiliated holders and (ii) with
respect to which a percentage of holders (determined pursuant to the terms of the
Obligation) at least equal to sixty-six-and–two-thirds is required to consent to the
event which would otherwise constitute a Restructuring Credit Event.

Id.
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To determine whether the voluntary restructuring measures taken
by Argentina were in fact coerced, it is essential to understand the facts
on the ground in December 2001, when “Argentina, due to its rigid
monetary regime and fiscal structure, slid into the largest-ever sovereign
default at the end of 2001.” 533 Since January 2001, “[A]rgentina’s
economy [has] seemed to be teetering on the brink of collapse.” 534 From
March 2001, “investors [became] increasingly skeptical of [the
Argentine] government’s ability to revive the economy.” 535 In July
2001, hedge fund investors began to speculate about the default that
Argentina appeared to face. 536 From July to September 2001, “there
[were] fears that a widespread sell-off in emerging currencies could
spark a broader financial crisis” 537 and international financial news
immediately published that the speculation into Argentine default was
now a warning. 538 On August 28, 2001, JP Morgan acknowledged the
financial turmoil in Argentina. 539 As one analyst noted, “[T]he key
question for investors now [was] whether Argentina [would] default or
restructure its debts.” 540 On October 31, 2001, JP Morgan, in an e-mail
message to HWF Capital, entitled “scenario in case of restructuring,”
expressed that the possibility of restructuring had increased to “a high
implied probability of restructuring” and that the bondholders would
possibly recover only a part of their investment when their bonds were
swapped into new bonds. 541 On November 2, 2001, the Argentine
government officially declared that the voluntary obligation exchange
would be provided to domestic bondholders and pension funds, “which
many analysts regard[ed] as a technical default.” 542 Of the total amount
533. See David Levey, Sovereign Rating History, Moody’s Investor Service, Special
Comment at 3 (2002).
534. See Argentina Switch Rattles Currencies, BBC NEWS, June 19, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1397193.stm.
535. See Political Turmoil in Argentina, BBC NEWS, Mar. 4, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1201074.stm.
536. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 32.
537.
Currency Nerves Hit Emerging Markets, BBC NEWS, July 9, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1429957.stm.
538. EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 32.
539. Id. ¶ 33. “Argentina initially juggled its debt dilemma by putting off private
bondholders while negotiating with the IMF.” Hornbeck, supra note 443, at 7.
540. Argentina’s Economy Set to Shrink, BBC NEWS, Sept. 1, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1520268.stm.
541. EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 33.
542. Argentina Announces Debt “Default” Plan, supra note 484.
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of Argentina’s sovereign debt ($132 billion), this amount corresponded
to between $40 and $50 billion. 543 De la Rua implored the bondholders
to readjust their bonds into ones with lower interest rates and longer
maturity, 544 causing many analysts to say that the coercive nature of the
bond swap made it a default in all but name. 545 The measures taken by
Argentina, Latin America’s third largest economy, constituted the
largest sovereign debt default since 1824. 546 In fact, “[S&P] warned that
it might downgrade Argentina’s sovereign credit rating again, depending
on the losses bondholders suffer in the debt swap.” 547
The government’s restructuring plan changed the contractual
arrangements of the debts, which decreased the value of the investments
of domestic bondholders. 548 The news media and credit rating agencies
implied that the voluntary obligation exchange was essentially a default,
and that domestic creditors had no real choice but to accept the
voluntary obligation exchange. 549
Although the Argentine government purported the restructuring to
be voluntary, 550 the obligation exchange was actually economically
coercive. The domestic bondholders to whom the “suggestion” was
issued had no real choice but to give in. A news article on the emerging
market describes the “Hobson’s choice” 551 proposed to the investors as
follows:
Significant volume bondholders do NOT have an alternative but to
participate in the swap. Not doing so is to shoot themselves dead. If
543.
544.
545.
546.

EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 36.
Id. ¶ 33.
Argentina Announces Debt “Default” Plan, supra note 484.
See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 34; see also Hornbeck, supra note
443, at 1.
547. Argentina Announces Debt “Default” Plan, supra note 484. One should
generally “note that a credit rating is not a recommendation to buy (or equally, sell) a
particular bond, nor is it a comment on market expectations.” CHOUDHRY, supra note
56, at 11.
548. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 35.
549. Id.
550. Argentina Announces Debt “Default” Plan, supra note 484 (“President de la
Rua said the bond swap will be voluntary, but gave no details to how it would be
achieved.”); see also Hornbeck, supra note 443, at 2 (showing that, in fact, the
Argentine government has reasoned that the voluntary participants in restructuring
plans are only the International Financial Institutions such as IMF, World Bank, which
have continued to lend to republic Argentina, and those creditors).
551. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 50.
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they participate they still have at least a shot of things working out . .
. . [T]hey are given par to par without having to undergo the painful
552
process of having to mark their brand new loans down.

If individual bondholders refused the debt swap, according to one
source, the Argentine financial authority planned to provide pressure by
threatening an audit in the near future, 553 which was bound to have
significant damages 554 as “[f]ears [were] still growing that three years of
economic stagnation [w]ould leave the country without the funds to pay
its [astronomical] debt.” 555 The gun was pointed at the domestic
bondholders’ heads. 556 Including a “package of measures designed to
bolster the country’s economy,” the voluntary obligation exchange
provided by the Argentine government forced them to choose from
“only one path.” 557 The only choices they had were to accept the
restructuring that came with payment protection, and which had a lower
interest rate, longer maturity, and was supported with tax revenue, or to
retain the bonds and face severe loss due to the revision of Argentine
law. 558 Regardless of whether rational standards or common sense was
applied, this was mandatory and in line with the purpose as described
under the ISDA definitions, so accepting the terms was an economic
necessity. 559 If the terms were denied, then creditors who were already
saddled with loss would have ended up in economic destruction. 560
Moreover, contrary to JP Morgan’s statement, the so-called “debt swap”
did not include cancelling the bond obligation. 561 Bonds were included
in a trust used to protect the performance of the government in the form
of modified bonds. 562 Payment of the bonds changed so that the bonds
could be returned in case of Argentina’s default. 563 Thus, investors felt

552.
553.
554.
555.

Id.
See id. ¶ 51.
See id.
Argentina Minister Appeals for Calm, BBC NEWS, July 13, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1436129.stm.
556. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 51.
557. See id. ¶ 52; see also Argentina Debt Sparks Foreign Fears, BBC NEWS, July
12, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1434592.stm.
558. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 52.
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. Id. ¶ 53.
562. Id.
563. See id.
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that this government-driven “restructuring” plan was a default in all but
name.
EGMF sent a third notice of default on December 12, 2001, but JP
Morgan once again denied that a credit event had occurred, but did so
without any back-up or rational explanation. 564 JP Morgan provided the
following to EGMF on December 27, 2001:
This letter is our Credit Event Notice to you that a
“Repudiation/Moratorium” Credit Event occurred with respect to the
Reference Entity [Argentina] on or about December 24, 2001 when
the Reference Entity declared a moratorium, whether de facto or de
jure, with respect to one or more Obligations in an aggregate amount
of not less than the Default Requirement. This letter also comprises
our Notice of Publicly Available Information with respect to this
565
Credit Event.

On December 24, 2001, Argentina’s interim President Rodriguez
Saa declared in his inaugural speech that the time allowed for payment
of interest and principal on Argentina’s foreign obligations would be
extended. 566 In detail, the Argentine government declared that it would
immediately delay payment of the principal and interest on all foreign
debts, and that “devaluation and dollarization were not under
consideration.” 567 Both President De la Rua and Domingo Cavalo,
Argentina’s Minister of Economy, were dishonorably discharged in
December 2001, and the Argentine economy subsequently collapsed. 568
The Argentine government “defaulted on billions of dollars in
public obligations,” and gave up the fixed FOREX exchange rate system
that was linked to the U.S. dollar. 569 This, in turn, led to the devaluation
of Argentina’s peso. Stringent restrictions on withdrawal of bank
deposits led the new president, Eduardo Duhalde, to refer to the situation
as a bloodbath. 570 All of these events were the by-product of the
economic crisis that swept the nation in 2001, causing Argentina to

564.
565.
566.
567.
568.
569.
570.

See id. ¶ 54.
Id. ¶ 56.
See id. ¶ 57.
See Lopez, supra note 442, at 2.
See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 60.
See id. ¶ 60.
Id.
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restructure its billions of U.S. dollars in public debts during November
and early December 2001. 571
A claimant, who demanded active interpretation of the
restructuring, argued that numerous credit rating agencies concluded that
Argentina’s obligation exchange amounted to a default on the bond and
that the restructuring took place due to government threats. 572 Although
exchanged obligation is protected by Argentina’s tax revenue, it meant
that these bonds were placed on an inferior level compared to all other
bonds of the same class. 573 Based on this claimant’s argument,
Argentina’s restructuring satisfied the conditions of the credit event
occurrence.
In response to EGMF’s notification to JP Morgan that a credit event
had occurred, JP Morgan stated that the Obligation Exchange declared
by Argentina did not actually constitute a credit event because “[t]he
Domestic Exchange was not mandatory, it was not, as a matter of law,
an Obligation Exchange.” 574 Therefore, under JP Morgan’s theory, the
parties were not bound to any duty under the payment clause in the
agreement.
In their second notice to JP Morgan, EGMF argued that Argentina
undertook a restructuring, and thus a credit event occurred according to
the 1999 ISDA Definition sections 4.7 and 4.9. 575 EGMF provided the
following as proof:
(i) numerous debt rating agencies had concluded that Argentina’s
‘debt exchange’ constituted a default on the Republic’s dollardenominated bonds; (ii) the restructuring was conducted under
threats by the Argentine government, and (iii) the amended or
‘exchanged,’ obligations were now secured by Argentine tax
deposits, thereby effectively subordinating all remaining obligations
576
of the same class.

JP Morgan again refused payment of the premium under the swap
agreement clause. Instead, in a letter dated December 3, 2001, JP
Morgan insisted that, under restructuring, as it is defined by the ISDA,
the situation in Argentina was never voluntary and thus fell outside the
571.
572.
573.
574.
575.
576.

See id. ¶ 61.
See id. ¶ 40.
See id.
Appellee Brief, supra note 440, at *16.
See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 40.
Id.
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scope of a credit event. 577 JP Morgan argued that protection of the
securing bond of the same class as a result of the obligation exchange
merely turned the remaining bonds into a lower priority, but did not
change their priority upon payment. 578 EGMF, however, responded that
these types of arguments neglected the clear realities of Argentina’s
restructuring. 579
(iii) Modified Approach
Ignoring the market participant’s arguments, ISDA continues to
employ its modified version of the Credit Derivatives Definitions, which
preserves the definition of a restructuring credit event by discarding a
few sections and both modifying and inserting words.
Prior to creating its 1999 definitions, ISDA declared that
restructuring (“old-R”) is a credit event 580 that triggers existing swapcontract termination where it makes “the terms of the reference
obligation ‘materially less favorable’ to the creditor (or protection seller)
from an economic perspective.” 581
“The original 1999 ISDA
[definitions] defined restructuring [“origin-R”] among the standard
credit events 582 without containing the direct materiality clause and the
five specified conditions included in the definitions.” 583 This definition
aimed to remove vagueness, but was still open to more than one
interpretation, and created fierce arguments when courts aimed to
determine whether a credit event had occurred. 584 Thus, in order to

577.
578.
579.
580.

Id. ¶ 41.
Id.
Id.
See Conrad G. Bahlke & Paul N. Watterson, Jr., Credit Derivatives 2000:
Legal and Regulatory Update, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Apr. 2000, at 7,
available at http://www.srz.com/publications/publicationsDetail.aspx?publicationId=13
89 (introducing “Confirmation of OTC Credit Swap Transaction Single Reference
Entity – Non-Sovereign” a/k/s 1998 ISDA Long Form Confirmation); see also Taking
Stock of Derivatives: Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC Face Uncertain Futures
FAS 133 Arrives in Y2k, CAPITAL STROOCK MARKETS (Stroock & Stroock & Lavan
LLP, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 2000, at 7, http://www.stroock.com/SiteFiles/Pub87.pdf.
581. CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 47.
582. Id. at 48.
583. See id. at 47-48; supra note 360 and accompanying text.
584. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 48.
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reduce disputes, ISDA promulgated the Restructuring Supplement
(“Modified Restructuring” “Mod-R”). 585
The Mod-R definitions stipulated more precise conditions than the
prior version. Included within the definition was any action that brought
a “reduction in the amount of principal” 586 and “limited the term to
maturity of deliverable obligations” in the portfolio. 587 The Mod-R was
intended to reduce the conflict between the parties to the agreement.
Unfortunately, however, when the reference obligation in the credit
derivatives swap agreement was sovereign debts, the Mod-R clause was
not usually included. Furthermore, “[i]t is now viewed as a risk that all
forms of the Restructuring Credit Event could create a conflict of
interest for bank lenders who are also [taking] long protection
[positions].” 588 For this reason, even well-developed U.S. derivatives
markets have strongly supported erasing the Restructuring Credit Event
completely from the definitions. 589
Nevertheless, the Mod-R, which has now been consolidated into the
2003 ISDA definitions (“Mod-Mod-R”), has been used widely in U.S.
derivatives markets. 590 In fact, subsequent to the introduction of the
Mod-R, a divergent derivatives business was transacted, subject to these
clauses. 591
When incorporated by ISDA, Mod-R contains several restructuringrelated supplemental clauses, including section 4.10(b) of the Multiple
Holder Obligation (“MHO”). 592
This section requires that “the
Restructuring Credit Event can occur only with respect to an obligation .
. . [when it is] held by more than three holders that are not Affiliates of
each other, at the time the Credit Event Notice is delivered.” 593 It
further stipulates that “with respect to [the] percentage of holders
(determined pursuant to the terms of the Obligation) at least equal to

585.
586.
587.

FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 70.
See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 47-48.
Id. at 48 (“[I]n practice this has placed a maturity limit on deliverable
obligations of 30 months.”).
588.
FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 72.
589. Id.; see BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 295 (“[M]ost market participants point to the
Conseco case . . . as a major catalyst of the debate that culminated with the adoption of
a new set of provisions regarding restructuring in CDS contracts.”).
590. FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 70.
591. See id.
592. See, e.g., 2001 RESTRUCTURING SUPPLEMENT, supra note 330, § 4.10(b).
593. Id. § 4.10(b)(i).
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sixty-six–and–two-thirds is required to consent to the event which would
otherwise constitute a Restructuring Credit Event.” 594
Mod-R extends its scope of application into all types of
restructuring in the Mod-Mod-R Definitions 595 and amends the prior
restructuring definitions to remove any reference to Obligation
Exchange. 596
The 2003 [ISDA] Definitions offer parties four choices relating to
Restructuring: (i) trade without Restructuring [“no-R”]; (ii) trade
with “full” Restructuring [“origin-R”], with no modification to the
Deliverable Obligations aspect; (iii) trade with “Modified
Restructuring” [“Mod-R”], as has been market practice in North
America since the publication of the Restructuring Supplement in
May 2001; or (iv) trade with “Modified Modified Restructuring”
[“Mod-Mod-R”], which is a new provision, generally aimed to
597
address issues raised in the European market.

Under the origin-R definitions, the obligation exchange caused
restructurings and the obligation’s underlying terms did not actually
change, but protection sellers were subject to a “mandatory” exchange
into other bonds that treated the bonds less favorably regarding both
maturity and interest rate. 598
The 2003 ISDA definitions provided further clarification by
replacing opaque language, stating that “the restructuring credit event
had to be binding on ‘all’ holders of the restructured debt.” 599
Furthermore, the Mod-Mod-R definitions repealed both the concept of
obligation exchange and the mandatory requirement of the exchange. 600
Instead, restructuring only applies when the following conditions are
met:
With respect to one or more Obligation, and in relation to aggregate
amount of not less than the Default Requirement, any one or more of

594.
595.
596.
597.

Id. § 4.10(b)(ii).
See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 70.
Id. at 63.
Press Release, ISDA, ISDA Publishes 2003 ISDA Credit Derivatives
Definitions (Feb. 11, 2003), http://www.isda/org/press/index.html.
598. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 69.
599. CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 49; 2003 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 427, §
4.7(a) (emphasis added).
600. See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.9 (defining obligation
exchange).
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the following events occurs, (i) is agreed between the Reference
Entity or a Governmental Authority and a sufficient number of
holders of such Obligation to bind all holders of the Obligation or (ii)
is announced (or otherwise decreed) by a Reference Entity or a
Governmental Authority in a form that is binding upon all the
holders of such Obligation, and (iii) such event is not expressly
provided for under the terms of such Obligation in effect as of the
later of the Trade Date and the date as of which such Obligation is
601
issued or incurred:

The Mod-Mod-R did not provide a substitute to “voluntary”
sovereign debt restructurings, however, and without a multiple action
clause in its definitions, a restructuring credit event cannot be triggered
on a reluctant minority of creditors. 602 Thus, under this section, “a
voluntary [obligation] exchange would not trigger a restructuring credit
event unless and until all [bond]holders tendered their obligations.” 603
One possible interpretation of this analysis is that if all bondholders
individually agree to the restructuring plans without coercion and accept
the given conditions by tendering their bonds regardless of damages, it
might trigger a credit event. 604 This situation is unlikely, however,
given that it is impossible for every bondholder to participate in a debt
exchange. 605
For these reasons, the Mod-Mod-R definitions are similar to the
origin-R definitions under the de facto test. 606 Therefore, the voluntary
debt exchange will not trigger a credit event even under up-to-date
definitions. 607 Many swap market participants learned that it is difficult
to objectively distinguish between voluntary and mandatory obligation
exchanges, as evidenced in EGMF. 608 Reflecting such understanding,
voluntary obligation exchanges were excluded from the origin-R
definition.
Additionally, market participants prefer to exclude voluntary
restructurings because if such definitions were included as part of the
601.
602.

2003 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 427, § 4.7(a).
See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Credit Derivatives and the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Process 71 (Apr. 27, 2004) (Harvard Law School Int’l Fin. Seminar) (on
file with author), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/pifs/pdfs/pierre_verdier.pdf.
603. Id.
604. See id.
605. See id.
606. See id.
607. Id.
608. See id.
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credit events list, protection buyers would be reluctant to enter into
derivatives transactions due to the attendant uncertainty. 609
Furthermore, after successful restructuring, protection sellers would
change their investment strategy because of the significantly
downgraded obligations. On the other hand, since restructuring plans
are usually carried out by bondholders at large, most unsecured
bondholders are reluctant to accede to the given terms. In fact, this
problematic scenario might not arise because of the small number of
secured bondholders who would free-ride on the government or
institutions-driven debt restructuring schemes. Consequently, “even as
the sovereign credit derivatives market gradually migrates to the 2003
ISDA definitions, the distortion in restructuring incentives created by
these instruments will endure.” 610 Ultimately, a credit event would be
triggered by a prior default even under the Mod-Mod-R definitions in a
sovereign pre-default restructuring context. The real question that needs
to be asked, therefore, is: If the protection buyer and protection seller
use the multiple holder obligation clause on their credit derivatives
transaction, would the voluntary sovereign debt restructuring effectively
trigger a credit event?
It is generally understood that “[t]he changes in [contractual] terms
adopted as part of a restructuring normally fit one or more of the events
listed in the restructuring definition.” 611 Therefore, under either the
origin-R 612 or Mod-Mod-R 613 definitions, “[MHO] restructurings . . .
[clauses] are prima facie covered by the restructuring definition.” 614 It is
important to note, however, both definitions may be excluded if the

609.
610.
611.
612.

See id. at 71-72.
Id. at 72.
Id.
See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.7(a). “The origin-R
Definitions cover events that are agreed [upon] between the Reference Entity . . . and
the holder or holders of such Obligation.” Id.
613. See 2003 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 427, § 4.7(a). The Mod-Mod-R
Definitions more clearly define that if the terms “are agreed between the Reference
Entity . . . and a sufficient number of holders of such Obligation to bind all holders of
the Obligation” and it constitute restructuring credit event. Id.
614. Verdier, supra note 602, at 73.
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parties did not expressly include this in their agreement. 615 Based on
this approach, “no restructuring credit event would be triggered.” 616
Even with such an interpretation, there are different arguments as to
why this approach ought to be dismissed. 617 One commentator, who
analyzed the drafters’ intentions, stated that the drafters clearly did not
intend to exclude the collective action clause and the origin-R does not
expressly describe collective action clauses. 618 The true reason is that
derivatives market practices vary slightly between the United States and
Europe. 619 Considering the drafters’ knowledge of this fact, one can
conclude that the absence of MHO clauses in the definitions can trigger
the restructuring if their application was intentionally excluded. 620 This
outcome is even clearer under the Mod-R and Mod-Mod-R definitions.
As seen above, “voluntary [obligation] exchanges do not trigger the
clause.” 621 Therefore, it can only be assumed that “the drafters must
have been incorporating the use” of MHO clauses. 622
By adopting MHO clauses, 623 the drafters presumably intended to
erase the holdout creditor problem and solve the restructuring problem
in a collective manner that “otherwise makes restructurings difficult or
impossible.” 624 It has been said that “[t]he adoption [of MOH clauses in
the Mod-R and Mod-Mod-R definitions] is seen as a market-based
alternative to a more elaborate international bankruptcy regime,” 625
where the sovereign has no bankruptcy proceedings. It is not surprising,
615. See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.7(a) (1999). Note that the
2003 Definitions contain a substantially identical clause, but use the adverb “expressly.”
See 2003 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 427, § 4.7(a).
616. See Verdier, supra note 602, at 73.
617. See id.
618. See id.
619. See id. at 73-74 (arguing that regardless of ISDA Definitions, “[b]onds issued
in London, both corporate and sovereign, routinely include collective action clauses,
and these provisions are frequently used to implement restructurings”).
620. See id. at 74.
621. Id.
622. See id.
623. See id. (indicating that these clauses allow a supermajority of holders to bind
the minority to the financial terms of a restructuring).
624. See id.
625. Id. at 73; see, e.g., John B. Taylor, Under Sec’y of Treasury for Int’l Affairs,
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S. Perspective, Speech at the Conference
“Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards” (Apr. 2, 2002) (Inst. for Int’l Econ.,
Washington, D.C.), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/print.cfm?doc=
pub&ResearchID=455.
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however, that if MHO clauses control the credit derivatives agreement,
“the protection buyer’s argument that the [obligation] exchange is in fact
involuntary is stronger, because the [debt] restructuring can be enforced
against him even if he votes against it.” 626 Indeed, “even if a protection
buyer votes for a restructuring, some coercion still occurs, as the
[restructuring] negotiations are conducted under the shadow of the . . .
[MHO clause’s] potential utilization.” 627
Thus far, no data or reports indicate that MHO clauses have been
used in actual restructurings in the marketplace. Excluding such clauses
from credit event definitions would “dilute their effect,” 628 however,
with the desire that the restructuring will fail and the reference entity
“will default, thus triggering the credit event.” 629 Obviously, the current
argument about restructuring would be somewhat alleviated by the 75%
or 85% super-majority voting prong under MHO clauses, as an
alternative to the de facto prong voluntary debt exchange. 630
3. Suggested Approach
The concepts of default and credit event occurrence are not
considered the same. As the case of Conseco shows, a credit event is a
priority concept that includes default. 631 Even when default does not

626.
627.
628.
629.
630.
631.

Verdier, supra note 602, at 75.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 294 (summarizing the consequences of the
Conseco case). A brief history of the restructuring of Conseco Inc. is as follows:
In October 2000, [in order to overcome a deteriorating financial outlook], the
company and its [lending] bankers agreed to a restructuring of its [outstanding] loans,
which included an extension of maturity [under the higher interest rate charge and add
extra collateralization]. In the bank loan market [arena] this was not seen particularly
as a credit negative as it headed off a potential liquidity crisis. [Because such a
restructuring helps Conseco’s currently impending liquidity crunch]. However, some
bankers who had bought protection on Conseco gave notice of restructuring and then
delivered long-dated bonds, which were trading significantly lower than the
restructured bank loans. This outcome was viewed negatively by protection Sellers
who were not expecting to suffer an economic loss on a “soft” Credit Event that was a
result of credit deterioration but fell short of a full default or bankruptcy.

FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 70. “Under the modified restructuring definition,
where the triggering event is restructuring, the delivered obligation cannot have a
maturity that is longer than the original maturity date of the credit derivative contract, or
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actually take place, a credit event may occur when the conditions for
payment on the CDS agreement are satisfied. 632
On November 6, 2001, S&P and Pitch lowered the credit rating of
the Argentine bonds, stating that Argentina’s domestic restructuring plan
constituted a partial default. 633 At the time, S&P announced publicly
that it would lower the rating on the investments made on Argentina’s
existing obligations to the default level. 634 In other words, credit rating
agencies defined this event as a de facto default.
The 1999 ISDA definitions were intended to classify what
constitutes a credit event because certainty and objectivity are extremely
important factors when laying out the parameters of what constitutes a
credit event. 635 When the scope of the credit event is divided, it is
necessary that it be interpreted narrowly using the literal meaning; it also
means staying away from analogical interpretation after the fact. In the
past, the credit event occurred automatically, even without default,
because a credit event is a broader concept than restructuring. As time
passed, however, it was interpreted more narrowly. 636
Further review is required to determine whether the voluntary
restructuring that occurred in Argentina in 2001 should be perceived as a
de facto state of default, which would result in conditions for payment in
accordance with the credit agencies’ interpretation. To determine
whether de facto events of default took place in Argentina, it is
important to understand what kind of default the parties had in mind at
the time of the agreement.
When DITM signed the agreement with JP Morgan in 1996, they
used an earlier ISDA definition regarding what restructuring would
constitute a credit event. After defining credit event in 1999, ISDA
more than 30 months after the original maturity date.” CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 48
n.9.
632. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
633. See Kathryn M.E. Dominguez & Linda L. Tesar, International Borrowing and
Macroeconomic Performance in Argentina 25, Univ. of Mich. and NBER (Nov. 30,
2004; revised Feb. 14, 2005), http://www-personal.umich.edu/~ltesar/pdf/NBER2005.p
df.
634. See Geert Bekaert & Campbell R. Harvey’s Chronology of Economic, Political
and Financial Events in Emerging Markets, http://www.duke.edu/~charvey/Country_ris
k/chronology/argentina.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
635. See Pollack, supra note 337, at 45.
636. See 2003 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 427, § 4.9 (indicating evidence that
ISDA repealed the original section 4.9 definitions and transplanted a different, narrower
standard).
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continued to focus on narrowing the scope of application of the credit
event. Accordingly, based on the 1999 ISDA definition of a credit
event, CDS agreements that were signed by United States hedge funds
like EGMF and JP Morgan should be interpreted narrowly and passively
in accordance with the Master Agreement when determining the scope
of application for the credit event. In the meantime, the definition of
restructuring related to the DGB2 fund that existed prior to the ISDA
definitions should be used in a more comprehensive manner. 637
Although the credit event referred to by the agreement between hedge
funds and DGB2 funds leads to the same crisis because of Argentina’s
restructuring, it could be construed differently. Although JP Morgan
insists that a credit event did not occur under the agreement, a credit
event would have occurred under the agreement if it were a DGB2 fund.
C. Aon Financial Products
1. Background
Ursa Minor Ltd. (“Ursa”) is a Cayman Islands company, while
Bankers Trustee Company Ltd. (“Bankers”) and Bear Stearns
International Ltd. (“BSIL”) are both English businesses. 638
On February 4, 1999, BSIL signed an agreement for a loan in the
amount of $9,307,000, with Ecobel Land, Inc. (“Ecobel”), a Philippines
company that sought to construct a high rise condominium. 639 As a
requirement of this agreement, Ecobel had to procure a surety bond
protected by the government, and the Philippine government had to
guarantee payment to the creditor, BSIL. 640

637. Cf. Pollack, supra note 337, at 45.
Even if the Restructuring definition was revised to only capture distressed exchanges .
. . such an objective definition will still create areas of unmatched risk hedging. For
example, protection sellers may manipulate the termination of a credit default swap by
prematurely triggering at a time when such a result maximizes their financial gain.
Therefore, regardless of whether the Restructuring definition is redefined to eliminate
more subjective restructurings, the definition will still lead to less than complete credit
protection.

Id.
638. Complaint ¶¶ 6-7 Aon Fin. Prods., Inc. v. Societe Generale, 2000 WL
34015582 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) Nos. 00CIV. 5863, 00CIV 2474.
639. Id. ¶ 9.
640. See id. ¶ 10.
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On February 4, 1999, BSIL and Aon Financial Products (“AFP”)
signed a CDS agreement. 641 A little over a month later, on March 8,
1999, AFP and Societe Generale signed a second CDS agreement as
additional security for AFP’s undertakings with BSIL. 642
The
agreement enumerated what constituted a credit agreement. 643
According to the agreement, AFP agreed to pay BSIL when a credit
event occurred, in this instance meaning if the loan was not paid by the
Philippine government. 644 Detailed information about the credit event
under the agreement is as follows: (i) lack of authority or capacity
regarding the loan agreement or surety bond, (ii) the inability to
perform, illegality, or a void of the loan agreement or surety bond, and
(iii) default as a result of an applicable law, order, regulation, decree, or
notice. 645
On March 26, 1999, AFP, BSIL, Ursa and Bankers signed the
assignment and assumption agreement. 646 In this agreement, BSIL
transferred all rights dictated under the credit swap agreement to Ursa,
with the other parties agreeing. 647 Ursa designated Bankers as trustee,
and assigned all rights under the agreement to Bankers. 648
On March 11, 1998, GSIS issued a surety bond with the Philippine
Veterans Bank as creditor, naming Ecobel as the principal debtor. 649
The surety bond was to be transferred to BSIL on February 10, 1999. 650
The surety bond was never issued to BSIL, however, and was not
assigned or transferred to the Philippine Veterans Bank. 651
Ecobel, the principal debtor, intended to default on or about March
1, 2000. 652 Thus, Bankers notified Ecobel by facsimile on March 7,
2000 of the failure to pay. 653 They also notified GSIS to provide
payment according to the loan agreement. 654 On the same day, Bankers
641.
642.
643.
644.
645.
646.
647.
648.
649.
650.
651.
652.
653.
654.

Id. ¶ 11.
See id. ¶ 12.
See id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 20.
Id. ¶ 21.
See id. ¶ 24.
Id. ¶ 25.
Id. ¶ 26.
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notified AFP of this event, and advised that they intended to pursue a
claim following the credit swap agreement. 655 This notice said that
Bankers would not get any repayment from GSIS or Ecobel, and that
GSIS did not duly authorize the issuance of a surety bond, and none was
transferred. 656
BSIL subsequently requested that AFP make payment as originally
agreed under the credit swap agreement. 657 On March 10, 2000, Aon
replied that there was no failure to pay because it was yet to be
determined whether this was, in fact, a credit event. 658
On March 15, 2000, GSIS notified BSIL and Ecobel that the surety
bond issued for the Philippine Veterans Bank had been cancelled. 659
Accordingly, because the obligee had not joined this event, no
assignment occurred, and a reference obligation did not exist under the
credit swap agreement. 660 At the same time, it induced a dispute about
whether a credit event occurred. 661
A week later, on March 22, 2000, AFP brought a declaratory
judgment suit against BSIL and Ursa asserting that AFP was obligated
to the surety bond in accordance with the credit swap agreement. 662 If
AFP was to lose the litigation, Societe Generale would have to provide
reimbursement. 663 On the same day, Aon notified Societe Generale of
the credit event and requested immediate payment. 664
On March 31, 2000, Ursa, with Bankers and BSIL as co-plaintiffs,
initiated a separate suit against AFP and Aon alleging that each
company’s obligations under the CDS agreement were violated. 665 In
this suit, the court recognized that a credit event took place in March
2000, and the court entered summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs. 666

655.
656.
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.
662.
663.
664.
665.
666.

Id. ¶ 27.
Id. ¶ 28.
Id. ¶ 29.
See id. ¶ 30.
Id. ¶ 31.
See id. ¶ 31.
See id. ¶ 32.
Id. ¶ 33.
See id. ¶ 34.
See id. ¶ 33.
See id. ¶ 35.
See id. ¶ 36.
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2. Issue
Among other things, the issue in this scenario is whether the
guarantor’s (GSIS) refusal of repayment constitutes a credit event. In
general, a suretyship obligation refers to the debt that needs to be
performed, in all or in part, or payment of an undertaking, if the
principal obligation is defaulted. 667 A suretyship obligation assumes the
same duty, nature, and scope as the principal debt, and functions in a
way that secures the principal obligation. 668 In general, a suretyship
obligation is established by an agreement between the creditor and
guarantor. 669 This agreement is not independent, but rather is signed
within the document in order to secure the debt between the creditor and
principal debtor. 670
In the end, the conditions for establishment of a suretyship
obligation are the existence of a surety agreement between the guarantor
and the creditor and the existence of a principal obligation. The
specifics of the suretyship obligation are decided by the surety
agreement and the principal obligation. For one obligation or payment,
each of the two debtors assumes independent obligations.
Suretyship obligations have inherent legal characteristics such as
independence, 671 appendant nature, accompaniment, complementariness,
667.
668.

See Berkley, supra note 29, at 354.
See id. Strictly speaking, surety and guaranty have different meanings: The
former means “an agreement to be jointly and severally liable for the payment or
performance obligation without necessity for first exhausting rights and remedies
against borrower,” while the latter means “technically an agreement to pay or perform
an obligation only if primary obligor fails to do so.” Id. at 354; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 1 cmt. m (1996) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
But see Aicher et al., supra note 81, at 920.
The reality is that, as a practical matter, surety and guaranty have lost their
distinctions in the modern world. After endless hours of discussion, much research
and nearly as much frustration, the authors have concluded that although some
differences might exist, it simply isn’t useful to proceed on the premise that the
differences between surety agreements and guaranties are meaningful outside of the
context of insurance.

Id.
669. See RESTATEMENT § 1 cmt. m, supra note 668, at 7 (stating that “[t]he
[guarantor] may undertake its obligation as a result of direct dealings with the obligee
without the consent or knowledge of the principal obligor”).
670. See RESTATEMENT § 1 cmt. a, supra note 668. Thus, two contracts are made in
the general suretyship: “one between the secondary obligor and the principal obligor,
the other between the secondary obligor and the obligee.” Id.
671. Some commentators state that:
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and homogeneity. The suretyship obligation assumes the same content,
scope and quantity as the principal obligation. A suretyship obligation,
however, includes interest penalties on the principal obligation,
compensation for damages, and other obligations within the principal
obligation. 672
A suretyship obligation is separate, or independent from, the
principal obligation and “need not be identical to the underlying
obligation.” 673 These obligations form a subordinate relationship with
the principal obligation, however, in the sense that its purpose is to
secure performance of the principal obligation. Suretyship obligations
have the characteristic of becoming a subordinate of the principal
obligation. Thus, when a principal obligation is voided, 674 cancelled,

The relationship between the guarantor and creditor a guaranty creates is contractual
in nature and is generally subject to the laws of contract. . . . a guarantor is not
primarily liable on the underlying debt but instead has a secondary liability that will
be required to be paid only when the underlying obligor has defaulted in its obligation
to pay the underlying debt. A corollary of this distinction is that a guarantor is
generally not liable to pay the creditor on the underlying debt unless the underlying
obligor is liable to pay such debt to the creditor. Put differently, the independence
principle does not exist in the law of guaranties.

Aicher et al., supra note 81, at 912 (citation omitted).
672. See E. Quincy Servs. Dist. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d
694 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2001).
[O]nce a surety assumes the contract of its principal, it stands in the same position to
the contract as the principal, including all liabilities; [and] a surety is thus liable for all
liquidated damages accruing before it assumed the contract, and is no longer limited
to its bond in completing the contract thereafter.

Id. at 697; see also In re Conservatorship of Huerta, 41 P.3d 814 (Kan. 2002).
In the case of debt on [a surety bond] for the payment of money only, . . . interest may
be recovered after default, even though it exceeds the penalty, and whether the action
be against principal or surety.
....
The penalty of the bond covers the misconduct of the principal; but the interest
allowed on the penalty is for the misconduct of the sureties for the delay in payment.
If the damages were paid when due, they would have earned interest.

Id. at 818 (citations omitted); see also Edmonds v. W. Sur. Co., 962 P.2d 323, 326
(Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (“When a [surety] bond is legally mandated, the obligation does
not include any penalties imposed on the principal obligor beyond actual losses suffered
by the obligee for failure of the principal to fulfill the underlying obligation, unless the
secondary obligation so provides.”).
673. See RESTATEMENT § 1 cmt. k, supra note 668 (noting that a secondary
obligation does not have to be identical to the original obligation).
674. See Aicher et al., supra note 81, at 913 (stating that “[A]s a general rule, if the
underlying debt is void, the guaranty is not enforceable either”).
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modified, 675 or terminated, the suretyship obligation’s fate is the
same. 676 When the bond on the principal obligation is transferred, the
suretyship obligation is also transferred. On the contrary, if there is a
change in the principal debtor as an assumption, the suretyship
obligation is terminated under the doctrine of collapsed fidelity. 677
Because a suretyship obligation is formed by the surety agreement
between creditor and guarantor, the guarantor’s mistake as to an
essential part of the contract will not become void even when the grantor
was deceived by the principal debtor’s inducement. 678 Originally, upon
arrival of the suretyship obligation’s due date, the creditor may require
its performance pursuant to their agreement that the guarantor be liable
in the event of default of the principal debtor. 679 When a specific credit
event takes place as it did here, a creditor may require performance by
the guarantor even before maturity, since the conditions on the
agreement are fulfilled. 680
3. Argument
As mentioned above, there is no question that the debtor’s failure to
pay constitutes a credit event. There is a dispute regarding whether the
guarantor’s refusal for repayment applies to the credit event, because the
guarantor has peremptory notice and inquiry rights. In other words, the
guarantor may demand that the creditor make a claim to the principal
675. See id. “[I]f the terms of the underlying debt are altered materially without the
consent of the guarantor, the guaranty may be unenforceable.” Id.
676. See Aicher et al., supra note 81, at 913.
677. See, e.g., Bier Pension Plan Trust v. Estate of Schneierson, 74 N.Y.2d 312, 315
(1st Dept. 1989) (“Under general contract rules, an obligation may not be altered
without the consent of the party who assumed the obligation.”); see also Midland Steel
Warehouse Corp. v. Godinger Silver Art Ltd., 276 A.D.2d 341, 343 (N.Y. App. Div.
2000).
678. See Bier Pension Plan Trust, 74 N.Y.2d at 315.
Although parties are generally bound by the terms of the agreement they sign, it is a
well-settled rule of law, that a contract of guaranty cannot be enforced by the
guarantee, where the guarantor has been induced to enter into the contract by
fraudulent misrepresentations or concealment on the part of the guarantee.”) (citation
and emphasis omitted).

Id.
679.
680.

See RESTATEMENT § 1, supra note 668.
See Phillips Factors Corp. v. Harbor Lane of Pensacola, Inc., 648 F. Supp.
1580, 1583 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (“[D]efault of one primarily liable triggers guarantor’s
duty of performance on the obligation.”).
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debtor first since they have the ability and capacity to repay. Under this
scenario, the creditor claims first to the principal debtor, and may only
make a claim to the guarantor if the principal debtor cannot repay.
Because of the time lapse between these two events, the relationship
between the parties could have changed significantly.
In this case, it is unclear whether GSIS exercised the “peremptory
notice and inquiry rights.” If this right was exercised, then the judgment
might differ because the guarantor can exercise the refusal of
performance by right due to the nature of the suretyship obligation and,
as such, it would be necessary to interpret what constitutes a credit
event.
GSIS denied the formation of a suretyship obligation and the courts
recognized it as a credit event. 681 Still, it is necessary to separate the
non-existence of a suretyship obligation, which cannot constitute a credit
event, from the guarantor’s refusal to repay. Only the latter should be
recognized as a credit event, because if suretyship does not exist
between a creditor and guarantor, for whatever reason, logically, a credit
event could not occur. The trial court’s finding that a credit event
occurred is questionable. 682
On appeal, however, the Second Circuit court stated that:
[n]either the default, which constituted a Failure to Pay under the
BSIL/Aon CDS contract, nor the Republic [of the Philippines’]
failure to honor its alleged statutory obligation, constituted a Failure
to Pay under the Aon/SG CDS contract. For the same reasons,
neither event constituted a “Repudiation.” They similarly do not
satisfy the other definitions of Credit Event enumerated in the
683
Aon/SG CDS contract.

Note, however, that this holding was based on the analysis of
whether the credit event notice was sent before the termination date, not
on a direct analysis of whether the enumerated credit events occurred. 684
The true meaning of the court’s holding is that there was a credit event,
but it simply had late notice. This reasoning is not satisfactory and has
not solved any of the confusion in this area of the law.

681. See Aon Fin. Prods. v. Société Générale, No. 00 Civ. 5863GBD, 2005 WL
427535, at *1, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2005).
682. See id. at *6.
683. Aon Fin. Prods. v. Société Générale, 476 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007).
684. See id. at 102-03.
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CONCLUSION
This Article explored the development of credit derivatives and
examined swap products, which are now important market tools. It also
introduced the legal characteristics of a credit derivatives swap and
examined various issues related to credit events that trigger changes in
the relationship of rights in credit derivatives agreements. Further,
lawsuits between EGMF and JP Morgan, and DITM and JP Morgan,
were examined to scrutinize the legal issues pertaining to Argentina’s
declaration of moratorium in the context of credit derivative instruments
and the occurrence of a credit event. Failure to pay was examined in
relation to the interpretation of the credit event, which was an issue
between Aon and Societe Generale.
As Moody’s declared, the investor’s main risk in credit derivatives
type transactions stems from the moral hazard of intermediary financial
institutions. 685 Due to the characteristics of the credit derivatives
instrument whereby intermediary financial institutions decide whether a
credit event occurred or not and make decisions on the scope of the loss,
a dispute might be inevitable. 686 The brokerage financial firms will
surely want to interpret the terms credit event and boundary of loss as
broadly as they possible.
As the Aon example shows, financial institutions that transact credit
derivative instruments want to interpret the term “credit event” as
broadly as possible. This argument is not convincing, however, when
principles such as materiality, objectivity, and certainty are factored into
the credit event. “[R]esolution of the debate over the [r]estructuring
[c]redit [e]vent is far from near.” 687 One critic further remarked that
“[i]t seems highly implausible that there will ever be a definition of
[r]estructuring that satisfies all market participants.” 688 The need for a
definition of restructuring, however, is undeniable. “There is a valid
concern expressed by market participants who favor inclusion of
[r]estructuring that its exclusion will create mismatches in credit risk

685. See e.g., TOLK, supra note 373, at 13. “Some other models do not rely on
moral hazard to explain financial crises . . . .” Id.; see STERN & FELDMAN, supra note
37, at 28.
686. See TOLK, supra note 373, at 2.
687. Pollack, supra note 337, at 44.
688. Id.
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hedging.” 689 Only when the definition of a credit event is interpreted
narrowly, as it is under the ISDA, is it possible to avoid confusion.

689.

Id.

